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  Abstract  
 
The purpose of the current study was to assess how RBF performed in terms of efficiency, 
effectiveness, equity and governance in the Zimbabwean context. It outlines the evolution of 
health systems thinking and health funding models over time to show the history and changing 
landscape of health care financing and their actors. General consensus is there is need to focus on 
results of health care investments against a background of prodigious amounts of foreign aid 
with marginal or no improvements in heath care delivery for decades of development assistance 
in developing countries. Health systems in developing countries are beset with burgeoning 
domestic and foreign debts as well as diminishing fiscal space that has more often put the 
primary health delivery system in developing nations in “comatose”. The research made use of 
both qualitative and quantitative dimensions. Findings indicate that the pre-RBF era was 
characterised by poor primary health outcomes, unsound governance and a lack of confidence in 
the public health delivery system. However, since RBF implementation, access to health care by 
marginalised groups has increased, with incentives and community participation liberalising 
health systems to greater efficiency as shown by slight increases in post-natal care visits in rural 
health care centres. A trade-off between achieving efficiency and equity was found especially 
when scaling up health programmes under the RBF initiative. Through embracing RBF, the 
primary health delivery system is poised for future development attributed to community buy-in 
and people-centric empowerment approaches. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
1.1 Background of the study 
The way a health system is financed has a significant bearing on the performance of its key 
functions of stewardship, inputs creation, services provision and ultimately, the achievement of 
the health system goals (Kirigia, Carrin, Preker, Mwikisa, and Diara-Nama, 2006). Invariably, 
the goals of a functional health system include improved health service delivery and 
responsiveness to people’s medical expectations. The major objectives of health financing are to 
make sure that funding for the health system is made available, ensure cost-effective 
interventions, set appropriate financial incentives for health care providers, and ensure that all 
individuals have access to effective public health and personal health care (Kirigia et al., 2006; 
Fretheim et al., 2014).  
Developing economies are the major recipients of health care finance as they are more often 
beset with resource constraints. Faced with a multitude of social objectives, governments in 
developing countries, as the custodians of funds, lack the capacity to drive health related 
programs. Hence, less priority is assigned in the allocation of funds to the health care sector 
(Dimovska et al., 2009). The report by Toonen et al. (2009) recognises that governments in 
developing countries realise that a strong health financing system is a priority, only that it is not 
regarded as a pre-requisite. The works of Emek (2015) outline that the best way to enhance the 
capacity of governments in health financing is to leave finance responsibilities to the private 
sector through the creation of public private partnerships. However, most developing country 
governments cannot envisage the possibility of delegating financial management to private 
players.  
Various health financing models have been developed for ensuring the effectiveness of health 
care financing systems across the world (Murray and Frenk, 2000) for example, the standard 
health-financing model, Bamako Initiative, coordinated basket funding, decentralised 
government funding and recently, results based financing. These health-financing models were 
developed in the wake of the realisation that most developing countries are battling to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of their health systems in the face of constrained fiscal space. 
Two similar models are the standard health-funding model and the Bamako Initiative; whose 
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notable misassumptions are that countering resource constraints and the provision of incentives 
deliver anticipated results. The standard health-funding model is a pro-poor model developed to 
exempt vulnerable members of society from paying user fees. In essence, the standard health 
model emphasised the provision of incentives to improve and strengthen the efficiency of health 
systems (Quaye, 2007). The Bamako Initiative was introduced to counter resource constraints 
and practical implementation within health systems (Omololu, Okunola and Salami, 2012).   
The Coordinated Basket Funding was developed with the need to pool resources from the donor 
community and entrust the funds under the custody of the central treasury, which was assigned 
with the dispensation to distribute the funds to areas of need. It has been criticised on its lack of 
sound checks and balances, accountability and fears of misappropriation and misallocation of 
funds, as country datasets are not reliable. Moreover, it yielded disappointing results since most 
governments in the developing countries have not been allocating the donor funds meant for 
health funding for intended purposes. In a study of health financing in Ghana, Nigeria and South 
Africa, Burke and Sridhar (2013) found out that the political nature of funding allocations in 
these countries was likely to result in misappropriation of funds and unreliable data sets. 
The decentralised government funding has been born out of the need to minimise political clout 
in the allocation of health funds as well as empower local governments to play a leading role in 
health financing. A successful implementation of the decentralised government funding as a 
health care financing model was implemented in Tanzania under the banner of decentralisation 
by devolution of power. This mode of decentralisation subscribed to principles of transparency, 
participation and accountability (Nibbering and Swart, 2008). The Results Based Finance (RBF) 
is a recently proposed health financing framework championed by the World Bank for wholesale 
adoption in assessing the performance of the health sector in developing countries (O’Brien and 
Kabur, 2013). The works of Musgrove (2011) define the RBF as a form of funding for project 
implementation or service provision, where the principal, who provides funding pays the agent 
who implements the project or provides the service, upon achieving predefined results. 
Grittner (2013) contends that the increased use of RBF as the preferred health-financing model in 
contemporary development aid management is part of international efforts to make aid more 
effective, and to link health care finance more closely to results in the health sector. It is 
pertinent to note that previous health financing approaches did not deliver the desired results 
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(Pereira and Villota, 2012). As a consequence, health coverage in developing countries remained 
insufficient and health outcomes lagged far behind targets set under the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) particularly MDG goals 4 and 5 of reducing under five mortality by 
two thirds and maternal mortality by three quarters respectively (Lozano et al., 2011; Sithole, 
2013).  
In addition, health financing paradigms such as the Bamako Initiative and the Standard Model 
were bogged by an imbalance of power between providers and clients that led to poor quality, 
poor curative and preventive services (Paganini, 2004). Governments were inclined not to lose 
their grip on health funds. Therefore, decentralised funding has been an elusive dream for many 
developing countries since the initiative tends to be unsatisfactory for a comprehensive 
assessment of health system performance with regards to the sustainability and equity of a health 
system (Arah et al., 2003). Whereas, the coordinated government funding risked 
misappropriation of funds as alluded by (Burke and Sridhar, 2013).  
As a developing economy, Zimbabwe has experimented with various health financing models 
since attaining political independence in 1980. In the formative years of independence, the young 
democracy embarked on an ambitious socialistic health-for-all drive. Following the prescription 
of the standard model, the poor and vulnerable were exempted from paying user fees when 
accessing health care services. Towards the late 1980’s, as resources became scarce and pressure 
for economic reforms and structural adjustment became more pronounced, health related donor 
funds were pooled together and placed under the ambit of the Ministry of Health and Child 
welfare (Sithole, 2013). Due to a lack of proper checks and balances and poor monitoring and 
evaluation, these health funds were either misappropriated or misallocated. The donor 
community pressured and influenced the adoption of decentralised government funding as the 
preferred health-financing model, which saw the government giving autonomy to district and 
provincial health centres in the management of health care funds.  
Prior to the implementation of RBF, the Zimbabwean health care sector faced a decade of 
declining health care provision characterised by poor health outcomes, scarcity and inept 
management of available health care resources (Acosta, 2011). These factors have militated 
against the ability of the Zimbabwean health care sector to achieve universal health service 
provision as enshrined under the dictates of Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5. 
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Nevertheless, the performance of health financing, especially aid funds have to be measured in 
terms of how they effectively help in achieving desirable health outcomes within health systems. 
Measures of health outcomes can be in terms of governance, sustainability, equity, effectiveness 
and efficiency. The combination of these measures gives a comprehensive outlook of the state of 
health outcomes. 
While acknowledging the existence of the above health financing models for measuring the 
performance of health systems, the current study sought to evaluate the performance of the RBF 
model in a resource constrained context of a typical developing country such as Zimbabwe. 
Performance based financing was used as the conceptual framework, cognisant of the fact that 
other health financing models were not outcome focused, as they were pre-occupied with the 
input and programme processing stages.  
1.2 Problem statement 
The interest in performance-based financing as a conceptual issue in health systems financing 
emanates from the observation that although public expenditure on health, particularly 
development health assistance, has increased in recent years in low income countries, results 
have been slow (Fretheim et al., 2014). Despite decades of development assistance and the 
proliferation of donors in the health arena, Zimbabwe’s health service delivery system 
deteriorated. In 2013, Zimbabwe’s national mortality ratio stood at 790 per 100 000 live births 
compared to 390 in the 1990s and the under-five mortality rate were 94 per 1000 00 live births 
up from 78 in the 1990s (Sithole, 2013). It appears that the endeavour by the Zimbabwean 
government to employ the aforementioned health financing models did not yield the desired 
results. It is within this context that the current study seeks to rethink health financing models 
particularly in a socio-economic dispensation characterised by severe economic crisis, persistent 
budget deficits and aid becoming a dominant part of health care financing instead of 
supplementing national health budgets.   
1.3 Research objectives 
i. To examine how health systems thinking influences the achievement of health outcomes
ii. To analyse the performance of RBF model in terms of sustainability, equity, allocative
efficiency and effectiveness.
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iii. To identify preconditions that supports the operation of health financing models in
Zimbabwe.
1.4 Research questions  
Has RBF managed to achieve favourable results to be the preferred financing model post the 
MDGs era? 
1.4.1 Sub-research questions 
i. How do health systems thinking influence the achievement of health outcomes?
ii. How has the RBF model performed in terms of governance, allocative efficiency and
effectiveness, sustainability, equity and inclusiveness within the Zimbabwean health care
system?
iii. Does Zimbabwe have preconditions that support the operation of the RBF model?
1.5 Justification of the study 
The current study seeks to add to the existing theoretical framework of RBF by assessing its 
effectiveness as the emerging preferred health care financing model in resource constrained 
environments such as in Zimbabwe. In addition, the research is justified on its theoretical 
contributions on RBF implementation in developing nations and specifically on how a country’s 
history can shape the health financing discourse, minimum conditions for effective aid delivery 
and performance of RBF in economically and politically fragile states. RBF is a relatively new 
phenomenon in health systems of developing countries such as Zimbabwe whose main objective 
is to strengthen health care provision at primary level. Therefore, there is need to understand 
some of the challenges that have militated against its effectiveness as an aid management tool, 
better understand minimum conditions in which it is likely to work so that Zimbabwe will seek 
institutional reform and capacity enhancement to facilitate sustainable health care financing and 
the health status of its citizens.  
On the other hand, the current study can be justified on the basis of its methodological 
contributions since it seeks to fill the dearth in information on the assessment of RBF in a 
resource-limited environment. Further, a thorough investigation of RBF within the health sector 
in Zimbabwe will provide a nuanced understanding of outcome oriented funding and aid 
programmes. This will assist policy makers, development practitioners and health programming 
specialists to refine policy making with respect to performance-based financing.   
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Moreover, the current study can be justified on the basis of its practical contributions. Research 
tactics borne from the current study will be used as a launch pad for further research as the 
researcher acquires more research skills. In addition to that, the study will inculcate critical 
thinking through the mastery of the research process and the acquisition of time management 
skills that are essential in the contemporary business environment.  
1.6 Assumptions of the study 
• Zimbabwe is technically efficient and lacks allocative efficiency in achieving health acre
outcomes.
• Implementing Results Based Financing (or more financial resources) will automatically
result in better health services, better health outcomes and improvement of health system
processes (Grittner, 2013).
• There is equal opportunity of individuals in society and any difference is unacceptable
and the state needs to intervene (Llavador and Roemer, 2001).
• Developing strategies to address inequity, requires understanding and deciding on how to
handle underlying conditions (USAID, 2011) (and the same can be assumed under
sustainability, governance and effectiveness, the economic framings in this study)
• Access to health services is a means of improving a population’s health.
• Results based financing is the emerging preferred financing model by donors in the
health sector.
1.7 Delimitations of the Study 
The health sector in Zimbabwe is broad, encompassing both public and private health care 
providers. This study is mainly confined to the primary health care providers in the Zimbabwean 
public health sector as its main unit of analysis. Primary health care providers under review in 
the current study include the donor community with a bias towards health financing, not for 
profit organisations, central and local government controlled public health centres as well as the 
implementation partners under the auspices of the public, private partnerships. 
Respondents to the study are limited to those health care personnel from the national up to 
district level. Access to all health care personnel might be limited as they are geographically 
dispersed across the wide breath of Zimbabwe. As such, the researcher mainly focused on rural-
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based health care personnel health as a special case group since RBF was piloted in rural areas in 
Zimbabwe.   
Not all possible participants were interviewed in all health centres where RBF was piloted since 
its inception in 2010. This could potentially bias results of the study in favour of the few whose 
views, opinions and perceptions were incorporated in the study. Nevertheless, measures were 
taken to ensure that participants to the study were directly responsible in the administration of 
RBF related projects and activities. A related limitation is that qualitative research used in this 
study cannot yield generalizable findings as larger sample studies can provide. In order to 
counter this shortcoming, the current study was premised on depth and theory building on the 
concept of RBF in a resource-constrained environment such as in Zimbabwe. Further 
quantitative studies can enhance this understanding through a correlational study.  
Focus of interview was limited to those with specific RBF knowledge. These people were mostly 
occupying positions of authority at various levels within the health delivery system. However, 
opinions of lower level staff could have presented an interesting perspective for similar future 
researches. The views of leaders in the health sector were taken to be representative of everyone 
in the sector.  
The study is also self-funded, which have limited the researcher in extending to other sectors of 
the economy like education, other countries and rural health centres but could only rely on 
secondary information where it was available. Furthermore, it was difficult to access essential 
data, which is not readily available to the public owing to bureaucratic procedures associated 
when one wants to collect data from government ministries and officials in developing countries. 
1.8 Thesis Outline 
The research intends to complement knowledge on performance of RBF in resource-constrained 
environments and lay groundwork for achievement of other development interventions in future. 
In order to achieve this, the research focuses on the background that has inspired the current 
research leading to the statement of the problem. Research objectives, statements of hypotheses 
and research questions then follow. The significance of the study is then reviewed in relation to 
the study’s theoretical, practical and methodological contributions. Delimitations and limitations 
of the study are taken into account in this section. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of pertinent and contemporary literature on the topic of health 
care financing models in a developing country context. In the process of reviewing literature 
efforts are made to identify inherent knowledge gaps between existing literature and the current 
research topic and establish a means through which the knowledge gap can be filled. Reliance is 
given to up-to-date secondary data sources in this section of the report so as to justify the 
relevance of the current research in the academic circles. Dominant theories that have not been 
modified and refined though from out-dated sources were also critically reviewed in this chapter. 
The chapter proceeds to outline the main schools of thought on the concept of health systems 
financing noting the points of convergence and divergence. These achievements are critically 
reviewed within the purview of the health outcomes under study. Efforts will be made to relate 
reviewed literature to the research objectives especially those that pertain to health outcomes. 
After this discussion, the following chapter will explore specific country experiences with 
various health financing models focusing on achievements, drawbacks and success factors in 
implementing RBF.   
2.1 Evolution of Development Aid 
The genesis of aid can be traced to the aftermath of World War Two (WWII) and the Cold War, 
where it was used as a diplomatic tool to foster political alliances and gain strategic advantages 
by the two rival superpowers, the USA and the now defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
of Russia (USSR) (Walters and Blake, 1992). It appears that this type of aid was regenerative as 
it assisted belligerent nations recover in the post war period. In peace times, aid is composed of 
grants and loans to developing countries from donor countries to promote political, 
developmental and welfare objectives in the recipient countries (Kanbur, 2003) 
Apart from being used for political purposes aid is now deployed to achieve developmental goals 
in low-income countries (Hjertholm, White and White, 1998). Aid came to the developing 
countries under themes such as “health for all” and “education for all” as well as concerted 
efforts to reduce poverty and uplift the general livelihood of the general populace (Bonfrer, 
2015). The pattern of health financing indicators reveals that overall health spending in sub-
Saharan Africa is low, especially in comparison with other regions (Pascual Serrano, Vera 
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Pasamontes and Girón Moreno, 2016).  Cognisant of these revelations, the current study seeks to 
rethink the health systems concept in line with resource constraint dilemma to achieve improved 
health outcomes as well as ascertain how RBF has performed as the emerging preferred funding 
model for health systems in developing countries.  
Earlier forms of aid under the Marshall Plan were reparation payments and support for fight 
against communism which critics have argued were strategic for the US in preventing a 
backslide of its economy through creating market for US capital goods and a congenial 
environment for American investment (Hjertholm, White and White, 1998). It is noteworthy that 
the money provided by the USA was in the form of grants from which no repayment was 
expected. The Marshall Plan proved to be an effective strategy to promote development as it 
helped countries in Europe to reconstruct and expand their economic base in a relatively short 
period of time (Roberts et al., 2002). The success of the Marshal Plan as the instrumental means 
to speed up development was replicated in the developing countries albeit in different and 
modified formats. Various modes of foreign aid delivery have evolved over the years, guided by 
the strategic interests of the donors and needs of the developing partners (Radelet, 2006; 
Mitchell, 2010). In the face of a multitude of foreign aid delivery modes, it is noteworthy to 
rethink and assess how RBF offers sustained results in a developing country context with the 
hope of improving health outcomes. 
2.2 Debates Surrounding Aid 
The use of aid to promote development in developing countries has courted a lot of controversy. 
Two main schools of thought with contrasting objectives have emerged; the welfarist school of 
thought and the dependency school of thought. The welfarist school of thought as propounded by 
Jeffrey Sachs, Joseph Stiglitz, Nicholas Stern and lately Bill Gates argues that foreign aid is 
necessary (Kaufmann, 2008). On the other extreme, the dependency school of thought with 
scholars such as Walter Rodney, Andre Gunder Frank, Dambisa Moyo, Julius Nyerere, Joseph 
Frankel, Amir Amin, Paul Prebisch and Thoetinos Dos Santo is critical of foreign aid (Radelet, 
2006).  
The welfarist school of thought believes that aid is a necessary tool that if utilised effectively can 
be used to extricate developing countries from the debilitating effects of poverty and spur 
economic growth. In this regard, Sachs and Ayittey (2009) argues that with the assistance of 
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foreign aid, most developing countries have been able to increase access to health services. Also, 
foreign aid has contributed to poverty reduction and economic growth in developing countries 
(Kaufmann, 2008). Generosity in foreign aid as propounded by the welfarists has been critically 
reviewed by the works of Sachs (2012) who however, contends that foreign aid related problems 
arise when conditions are attached or imposed by donors which tend to distort its effectiveness. 
In this regard, most health financing models are tied to a specific condition that results have to be 
evident for further financing to be advanced. Within the framing of the current study, it has to be 
seen whether setting conditions can reduce the conceptual appeal of health financing in terms of 
achieving health outcomes. 
Sachs (2012) is of the opinion that to enhance the effectiveness of a health financing system, it is 
necessary to tie some conditions to development aid. Flagrant abuse and misappropriation of 
funds have necessitated the need to assign donor expectations to foreign aid (Burke and Sridhar, 
2013). Most developing nations have weak governance systems for accountability of foreign aid, 
and as such, there has been a marked decrease in grants offered as donors seek to have an active 
participation in the health delivery process. The donor community is interested in a health-
financing model that is more transparent. Consequantly, the current study will relook into 
various health financing models with the hope of unlocking value to both the donors and the 
beneficiaries in terms of achieving health outcomes.  
The main import of the dependency school of thought is that giving aid will create a dependency 
syndrome as recipients rely on donors to sustain them until eternity. Foreign aid perpetuates 
dominance of rich powerful countries over poor developing countries and in most cases, which 
were their former colonies (Engelbert and Tull, 2008). Foreign aid bad as it enlarges the state 
bureaucracy, perpetuates bad governance and enriches the few political elites (Easterly, 2008). 
Rodney (1972) concurs that conditions often attached to foreign aid are structured in such a way 
that the developing countries remain dependent on the rich donor countries.  
Moyo (2010) agrees that there is little evidence that the benefits of foreign aid are serving the 
basic human needs such as health, education and nutrition. For decades into their independence, 
most African countries have not yielded tangible health related developmental results despite 
receiving massive foreign aid injections. Donors are currently looking for ways to scale up 
support while, at the same time, demonstrating the results they are achieving (Pearson, 2011).  
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What is clear from various debates across the entirety of the academic community on foreign aid, 
is that despite widespread condemnation of foreign aid by dependency theorists, more and more 
developing countries are making concerted efforts to attract foreign aid at whatever terms it is 
offered. In resource constrained environments that are synonymous with most developing 
countries, the misery of receiving conditional aid is much better than the misery of not receiving 
donor funds at all. This study intends to fill the gap in literature by showing the link between 
health care financing and the performance of health systems as shaped by the key debates on 
foreign aid in developing countries. This can be achieved through rethinking the operations of 
health systems within the dispensation of resource constraints and the need to achieve health 
outcomes.  
2.3 Aid Management 
Aid management refers to the systematic and rational techniques, principles and practices of 
raising, allocating and utilisation of aid so that it achieves set developmental objectives (OECD, 
2012). Broadly conceptualised, aid management places emphasis on the institutions, systems and 
procedures as well as mechanisms by which aid utilisation is controlled. Aid management seeks 
to promote the effectiveness of development aid to achieve set goals. Within the context of aid 
management, the current study seeks to relook how the aid management process can improve 
health outcomes in a manner that conjures community participation.  
Aid management has taken centre stage with respect to development in most developing 
countries and the world at large. The influential works of Buse and Walt (1996) put into 
perspective the ideology of aid management through health sector reform. The aims of health 
sector reform are widely held to include enhancing efficiency, effectiveness and equity within 
the sector. For these	  economic framings to be realised it is crucial to achieve coordination in aid 
management, since donors acting alone or at ideological odds with one another can frustrate or 
undermine the reform process (Buse and Walt, 1996). 
The consequences of poor coordination in aid management have been linked to inefficiencies in 
service delivery through duplication of effort, exasperating geographic inequalities through the 
targeting of assistance to favoured areas and populations, confusion through, for example, the 
espousal of conflicting and changing donor policies, exacerbation of administrative inefficiencies 
as ministry staff devote excessive time to coping with heterogeneous and incompatible aid 
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administration requirements, displaced local priorities as donors’ preferences prevail; and 
abrogation of recipient sovereignty over budgetary and policy processes (Buse and Walt, 1996). 
On the other hand, Álvarez and Acharyan (2012b) focused on effectiveness of aid management, 
and highlights that one of the obvious way to evaluate the effectiveness of aid is through  
examining the welfare benefits that can be attributed of aid funding to recipient countries. The 
accusations that aid is not doing enough to alleviate poverty and promote development have cast 
aid management into the spotlight. Moyo (2010) argues that decades into the independence of 
most African countries despite massive foreign aid injections have yielded no tangible 
developmental results. Donors are currently looking for ways to scale up support while, at the 
same time, demonstrating the results they are achieving (Pearson, 2011). Within the purview of 
poverty eradication and aid scale-up initiatives, financiers have to operate within the confines of 
measurable economic framings of efficiency, effectiveness, equity, inclusiveness, good 
governance, accountability and sustainability of their efforts. The current study seeks to evaluate 
how these economic framings can be best achieved in a developing country context.  
The emergence of RBF in recent years as a key aid management tool has aroused renewed 
interest world-wide in the area of aid management. It is still not clear whether the 
implemementation of RBF is the panacea to aid management in the developing countries context. 
This study seeks to aid close this gap by assessing the effectiveness of RBF with specific focus 
on Zimbabwe as a typical developing country that adopted RBF framework in 2010. The case of 
Zimbabwe’s public health is particularly strong given its persistent challenging environment in 
respect to governance, accountability and reduced public spending on health due to poor 
economic performance. 
2.4 Health Systems Thinking 
Health systems thinking refers to the philosophical underpinnings that shape and direct the aims 
and objectives of a health system within a given political context (Olmen, Van, Marchal, 
Damme, Van, Kegels, and Hill, 2012). Health systems are products of their time, emerging from 
specific discourses (Olmen et al., 2012), health systems thinking has evolved over the years as 
articulated below. 
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The genesis of health systems thinking can be traced to the emergence of the Alma Ata 
Declaration. The main thrust of the Alma Ata Declaration was to link health to social action. The 
declaration was convened out of the realisation that health issues were no longer purely medical 
and technically focused. The major import of the Alma Ata Declaration was the development of 
an agenda that obliged nations to provide primary health care services to their populations 
(Olmen et al., 2012). The Management Science for Health (2012) concur that the Alma Ata 
Declaration focused on primary health care as the optimal way to influence a healthy society. 
The deployment of health workers was instrumental in achieving the objectives of primary health 
care. 
Under the dictates of Alma Ata Declaration, the World Health Organisation (WHO) played an 
influential role towards ensuring access to universal health care through making funds available. 
The health financing thrust under the Alma Ata Declaration was focused on output such as 
training of health staff (nurses and doctors) and building of health centres at community level. 
The involvement of the WHO as a health financing partner sped the adoption and subsequent 
promotion of community participation in health-related issues (Health, 2012). Community 
participation meant the involvement of people within communities in minimizing the impact of 
specific diseases such as malaria. The social action approach was successful in countries such as 
India, China, Guatemala, Bangladesh and Nicaragua (Kirigia et al., 2006) .  
The 1990s marked the emergence of austerity measures under the World Bank’s structural 
adjustment programmes and the adoption of the New Public Management philosophy. These 
changes sparked shifts in health systems thinking as there was a marked decrease of government 
funding of social services in general and the health delivery system in particular in low income 
countries. Health system funding was increasingly placed in the hands of private players. 
Mcintyre (2012) notes that, “in contexts where government is not fulfilling its responsibility for 
funding health services, community-based health insurance schemes may be a temporary second-
best option for providing some financial protection.” 
The post 2000 period saw three major developments in the health arena that necessitated a 
paradigmatic shift in health systems thinking. To start with, there was a global change in the 
health systems actors’ landscape (Olmen et al., 2012). Private foundations and Global Health 
Initiatives emerged together with strategies such as the Millennium Development Goals. 
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Foundations such as the Melinda and Bill Gates foundation became major financiers of health 
systems in areas such as malaria control. In the United States, former President George Bush 
launched the Presidential Emergency Fund for AIDs Relief (PEPFAR) aimed at assisting low-
income countries affected by the AIDS epidemic (World Health Organisation, 2009). Secondly, 
the WHO began to pay more attention to the performance of health systems. The thinking 
underlying increased focus on the performance of health systems was on improving health 
services and encouraging governments to ensure that their health systems are responsive to the 
expectations of the population (Meesen, Soucat, 2011). Thirdly, the complexity of the health 
systems was recognised in health system research. Researchers working on health systems 
advocated a departure from mechanical thinking that characterised the health systems to a more 
holistic approach that included multiple actors (Olmen et al., 2012). The systems thinking 
approach promoted by Peter Senge drew attention to the complex nature of health systems, the 
interactions and feedback loops between blocks, role of the population and the unpredictable 
effects of change (World Health Organisation, 2009). The health systems’ thinking is of essence 
in this study as it provides philosophical underpinnings and frameworks for analysing 
performance of health systems in relation to financing. The focus of the current study is on the 
influence that health systems’ thinking has on health outcomes within a resource constrained 
Zimbabwean context.  
2.5 Health Financing Models 
2.5.1 The Standard Model 
Amongst the objectives of the standard health-financing model is the need to make health 
services more efficient and equitable. In this regard, the goal was to introduce sector changes and 
use other incentive methods to ensure efficient delivery of health services by health care 
providers (Quaye, 2007). The primary initiative towards ensuring accessibility of health care was 
to scrap user fees. This has the intended goal of protecting society’s most vulnerable.  
The issue of user fees has generated debate amongst health financing professionals. The 
imposition of user fees is retrogressive to the health care delivery system since they pose the risk 
of inequality in access to the use of health care services (White et al, 2006). User fees are an 
inefficient, regressive, and unfair way to cover funding gaps in basic social sectors, since the 
most needed segments of the population get excluded from access to these services. (Multi 
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Donor Trust Fund, 2011). Proponents who are against the imposition of user fees premise their 
arguments on the basis that poorer segments of the community are kept away from health 
services since they cannot afford to pay user fees. From a practical perspective, in its quest to 
achieve equity in health delivery the Kenyan government introduced a policy directive that 
exempted the poor from paying for health services (Wang’ombe et al., 2002).  
In addition, designing and implementing such systems has proven to be difficult in developing 
countries that face under-funded health delivery systems (Akortsu, 2013). In relation to the 
current study, it appears that health systems thinking must develop a model that rationalises on 
the enforcement of user fees to those who are capable of paying them. A significant number of 
the Zimbabwean population are without health insurance due to the pre-dominantly informal 
structural make-up of the economy (Sithole, 2013).  
2.5.2 The Bamako Initiative 
The Bamako Initiative was sponsored by UNICEF and WHO and adopted by African ministers 
of health in 1987. The model was based on the realisation that the primary health care systems in 
many sub-Saharan African countries were beset by a critical lack of resources and practical 
implementation strategies (Ebrahim, 1993). The works of Olmen et al., (2012) concur that health 
facilities in low income countries lacked resources and supplies to function effectively. The 
tenets of the Bamako Initiative bear a potential significant impact to the likely findings of the 
current study, since Zimbabwe is a highly indebted economy reeling under both local and foreign 
debt re-servicing obligations. This has made the allocation of resources especially towards health 
systems strengthening much weaker.  
The Bamako Initiative was widely used in Tanzania through a community-financing program. 
Paganini (2004:1) emphasise that the “Bamako Initiative was a pragmatic strategy to implement 
primary health care in the era of economic structural adjustment” as influence by UNICEF and 
WHO. Quaye (2007) points out that the aim is of the Bamako Initiative was to revitalize the 
public sector health care delivery system by strengthening district management teams and 
capturing some of the resources the people themselves are spending on health. Olmen et al., 
(2012:4) complements the above views by asserting that the Bamako Initiative was “comprised 
of a package of interventions to increase access, sustainability and efficiency, the most 
prominent of which were drug revolving funds and community participation both in funding and 
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decision-making.” The essence of the Bamako Initiative approach is that it recognises the 
importance of community involvement and health service decentralisation. In the same vein, 
RBF approach towards health systems funding seeks to establish quantitative and qualitative 
improvements in health systems through linking health funding to results.  
Circumstances that gave way to the emergence of the Bamako Initiative were that many health 
facilities lacked the resources and supplies to function effectively (Ebrahim, 1993). Lack of 
requisite resources increases lean time of the health care system leading to poor outcomes in 
terms of equity, efficiency, responsiveness, effectiveness and sustainability. As a result of 
resource constraints, health workers sometimes merely prescribe drugs to be bought from private 
outlets, often unlicensed and unsupervised, while many patients lost confidence in the inefficient 
and under-resourced public health facilities, and were not even bothering to turn up when sick, to 
the inefficient public clinics (Paganini, 2004). The sudden launch of the Bamako Initiative was a 
strategic response to the critics of the Growth Monitoring, Oral Rehydration, Immunization, 
Family Planning, Female Education (or GOBIFF) approach (Paganini, 2004). The GOBIFF was 
a selective primary health care approach that was operationalized at large scale by the then 
director of UNICEF James Grant in 1979 (Olmen et al., 2012). In the same context, the current 
study seeks to test the efficacy of RBF model in the primary health care system. The point of 
departure from GOBIFF is that the later was biased towards eliminating communicable diseases 
amongst vulnerable groups.  
2.5.3 Decentralised government funding 
Public funding of health care services includes all governmental sources of finance for health 
care services (Akortsu, 2013) financed through budgetary allocations (Ackon, 2003) from both 
direct and indirect tax revenues. Decentralisation can be defined as the delegation of powers, 
responsibilities and resources from higher to lower levels of government. A country may embark 
on decentralisation to democratise government, improve the effectiveness and efficiency of 
service delivery, create an enabling environment for local economic development, or a 
combination of any of these (Nibbering and Swart, 2008). Under the decentralised government 
funding system the Treasury and local authorities allocate a vote towards the financing of the 
health sector at national and local levels respectively. Successful decentralisation of health 
systems was done in Tanzania where the Government decentralised most functions through 
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Decentralisation by Devolution (Care, 2015). Under a decentralised government funding 
initiative, budgetary allocations are meant to ensure that citizens receive desirable basic health 
care. WHO (2005) recommend that the budget allocations at national and local level in relation 
to health funding should be pro-poor, observe the principles of fairness and responsiveness. It 
remains to be seen whether decentralised government funding can lead to improved health 
outcomes in terms of equity and sustainability since different health centres have varying needs 
that have a bearing on the identified health outcomes. 
Many developing countries are now involved in some form of decentralisation in response to the 
gradually erosion of centralised states as well as recognition of the potential role of local 
government in availing basic social services, especially to poor people (Nibbering and Swart, 
2008). The global imperative for democratisation and good governance has also fuelled societal 
demands for local democracy and accountability of local government. Decentralisation has the 
potential to link decision-making more closely to local priorities and bring processes of planning, 
implementation, monitoring and accountability closer to the population. From an RBF 
perspective it appears that democratisation of health systems can lead to better health outcomes 
as resources are ploughed closer to where action takes place.  
In order to reinforce this assertion, Akortsu (2013) outlined that in Ghana almost fifty-one per 
cent of all health care spending is from public funds, whereas in South Africa this figure stands 
at forty-one per cent and it is only twenty-five per cent in Nigeria. The justification of 
government involvement in health care financing is that in countries where the majority of health 
care institutions are government owned, then the government has to play an influential role in 
allocating substantial resources to this effect. In the Zimbabwean context economic structural 
adjustment programmes have decreased the government’s role in health financing. Therefore, the 
implementation of RBF has to be partner driven, as the government on its own is incapable to 
financing social services.  
However, the problem in most low-income countries is that their governments have not been 
able to finance their health systems adequately due to factors such as shrinking revenues 
(Bonfrer, 2015), low prioritization of health and poorly performing economies. This has opened 
way for donor support, which is often accused of coming with stringent conditions. This study 
while understanding that aid might come with conditions seeks to assess how effective that aid is 
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in achieving desirable health outcomes as well as influencing the performance of the health 
system.  
2.5.4 Coordinated basket funding 
The most commonly used and applied mechanism is the coordinated basket funding. Under the 
coordinated basket funding approach donors provide aid to the recipient country to finance the 
health system (Murray and Fenkel, 2006). The coordinated basket funding approach allows 
multiple actors other than the state to fund the health system. Donor funds are managed by a 
central organ, usually the government through the Ministry of Health with the expectation that 
they will be used to bolster the budget vote allocated to health (Hansen and Tarp, 2000).  
For decades’ donors, have used this mode of financing the health sector in low- income countries 
such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and many other African countries. However, this method of 
funding health has proved to be problematic in low- income countries. Evidence abounds that 
most governments in the developing countries have not been allocating the donor funds meant 
for health funding for intended purposes (Bangura, 1992). This has distorted the effectiveness of 
aid in the health sectors of low –income countries.   
2.5.6 Results Based Financing 
Results Based Financing Approaches, also commonly called Payment by Results are a form of 
financing that makes payments contingent on the verification of predetermined results (Sida, 
2015). From the perspective of Meessen and Sekabaraga (2011) performance-based financing is 
a mechanism by which health providers are, at least partially, funded on the basis on their 
performance. The health financing approach takes a radically different slant to the health system 
through giving organizational units’ substantial decision rights over their resources. A results 
based financing approach makes it possible to move the focus from activities and plans to the 
monitoring of results and learning about what actually works (Sida, 2015). Spors, Carbon and 
Specialist (2014) applied RBF tool to climate finance and established that the RBF tool is a 
useful financial tool manage the large flows of finance required to scale up mitigation activities 
and to increase flexibility to adjust plans in the light of unforeseen events/barriers through jointly 
agreed planning milestones. RBF appears to be a game changer in health financing in the 
Zimbabwean context where the government has been playing a leading role in health finance 
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during the first decade of independence, and then drastically cut spending on social services 
under the auspices of Economic Structural Adjustment Program. 
Contrasted from decentralised government funding and coordinated basket funding approaches, 
which focus on outputs, RBF essentially links funding to results and outcomes (Meesen et al, 
2011). Health system funding under RBF is supposed to bring about a qualitative and 
quantitative improvement in health care services in a way that ensures greater accountability and 
allocative efficiency. To improve efficiency in low income countries, there is need to 
significantly increase government spending and purchasing in the health sector (The World 
Bank, 2005). It is essential to identify the pattern of health spending in order to get a holistic 
appreciation of allocative efficiency in the health sector (Care, 2015). The works of Álvarez and 
Acharya (2012b) stress that a lack of predictability in receiving aid can hinder aid effectiveness.  
The sustainability of RBF funding in developing countries seems secure as it is now recognised 
as part of a national health financing strategy (Bonfrer, 2015). While the RBF model is not a 
panacea that ensures aid effectiveness it provides a viable framework for managing health 
funding that is linked to health system performance. RBF has been successfully used in 
developing countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and DRC and was introduced in Zimbabwe in 
2010. 
Grittner (2013) contrasts the concept of performance- based financing with line item approach, 
which finances the health system through the provision of inputs such as drugs. The underlying 
philosophy behind performance-based financing is that health funding should be closely linked 
to outcomes. The interest in performance-based financing as a conceptual issue in health systems 
financing emanates from the observation that although public expenditure on development health 
assistance has increased in low income countries, results have been slow (Fretheim et al., 2014). 
Meesen et al., (2011) argue that the concept of performance-based financing from which RBF is 
derived aims among other things to improve efficiency, greater accountability and to bring 
comparable results to inputs invested in the health systems. Within this purview, it is essential to 
note that the performance based financing framework requires a moderate to unlimited supply of 
resources and a complex network of organizations to implement which may not be readily 
available in many developing countries. 
20 
2.6 Selected Economic Framings in Health Care Assessment 
Within the purview of poverty eradication and aid scale-up initiatives, financiers have to operate 
within the confines of measurable economic framings of allocative, effectiveness, equity, 
inclusiveness, good governance, accountability and sustainability of their efforts. The current 
study seeks to evaluate how these economic framings can be best achieved in a developing 
country context. 
Aid management in health care refers to the systematic and rational techniques, principles and 
practices of raising, allocating and utilisation of aid so that it achieves set developmental 
objectives (OECD, 2012). Broadly conceptualised, aid management places emphasis on 
institutions, systems and procedures as well as mechanisms by which aid utilisation is controlled. 
Aid management seeks to promote the effectiveness of development aid to achieve set goals. 
Within the context of aid management, the current study seeks to relook how the aid 
management process can improve health outcomes in a manner that conjures community 
participation.  
Aid management has taken centre stage with respect to development in most developing 
countries and the world at large. The influential works of Buse and Walt (1996) put into 
perspective the ideology of aid management through health sector reform. The aims of health 
sector reform are widely held to include economic framings such as enhancing allocative 
efficiency, effectiveness and equity within the sector. For these	  economic framings to be realised 
it is crucial to achieve coordination in aid management, since donors acting alone or at 
ideological odds with one another can frustrate or undermine the reform process (Buse and Walt, 
1996). 
The consequences of poor coordination in aid management have been linked inefficiencies in 
service delivery through duplication of effort, exasperating geographic inequalities through the 
targeting of assistance to favoured areas and populations, confusion through, for example, the 
espousal of conflicting and changing donor policies, exacerbation of administrative inefficiencies 
as ministry staff devote excessive time to coping with heterogeneous and incompatible aid 
administration requirements, displaced local priorities as donors’ preferences prevail; and 
abrogation of recipient sovereignty over budgetary and policy processes (Buse and Walt, 1996). 
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On the other hand, Álvarez and Acharyan (2012) focused on effectiveness of aid management, 
and highlights that one of the obvious way to evaluate the effectiveness of aid is through  
examining the welfare benefits that can be attributed of aid funding to recipient countries. The 
accusations that aid is not doing enough to alleviate poverty and promote development have cast 
aid management into the spotlight.  An economic framing such as sustainability pertain to the 
ability of host countries to assume responsibility for programs and outcomes without adversely 
affecting the ability to maintain or continue program objectives or outcomes (Savedoff, 2011).  
Sustainable projects are those with benefits that are likely to continue after donor funding has 
been withdrawn. Allocative and effectiveness measure how well an aid project uses resources in 
order to obtain desired results, benefiting most people at low cost, whether the right share of 
resources is being devoted to health care versus other goods in the economy. Governance is the 
ability of host countries to assume responsibility for programs outcomes without adversely 
affecting the ability to maintain or continue program objectives or outcomes. Equity and 
inclusiveness imply that everyone should have equal access to community resources and, 
opportunities, policy should be directed with impartiality, fairness and justice towards these ends 
and community partnership is key in setting development needs. 
With respect to efficiency, performance-based financing is said to help in improving allocative 
and productive efficiency. Allocative efficiency is a result of enhanced stewardship of resources 
on the part of the recipients and ensuring resources are available to those who can yield better 
results to health investments on the part of the financiers. In terms of productive efficiency, 
health staff is motivated to utilize resources in a way that ensures desired results are achieved at 
minimum cost especially in remote areas where resource scarcity is a main issue that affects 
health services provision. Performance-based financing can promote technical efficiency within 
the health systems by increasing the productivity of health personnel (Basinga et al., 2011). 
Since health personnel are rewarded on the basis of their performance, it therefore implies that 
they are likely to improve their way of doing things, hence achieving technical efficiency.  
Performance-based financing provides a framework for verifying results and achievement of set 
targets within the health system which promotes accountability of health personnel to health 
funds providers, and through community participation, to the general public of health systems 
(Soeters and Griffiths, 2003). Improved accountability is an issue in health systems of low-
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income countries where accountability to end-users is often low. Sustainability has also been 
linked to accountability through a transmission mechanism that realises that a health delivery 
system that lacks accountability may fail to be sustainable in the long run. A comparative 
analysis of the operation of economic framings as they apply to different health financing models 
is given below 
Table 2.1: Health Financing Models and Economic Framings 
Governance Allocative 
Efficiency and 
Effectiveness 
Sustainability Equity and 
Inclusiveness 
Standard 
Model 
Move to scrap 
user fees on the 
poor 
Inefficiency in 
the health system 
is due to poor 
quality of health 
care. High levels 
of corruption 
affects the 
effectiveness of 
the health system 
(Medhekar, 2014) 
Critical shortage 
of essential 
medical supplies 
threated the 
sustainability of 
the model. In 
Nigeria 
government 
expenditure on 
health as a 
percentage of 
total government 
expenditure was 
very low at 3·3% 
in 2002 
(Awosusi, 
Folaranmi and 
Yates, 2015) 
Policy directives 
to exempt the 
poor from paying 
(Quaye, 2007) 
Bamako 
Initiative 
Focus was on 
regular contact 
between health-
care providers 
and communities. 
There was joint 
participation 
between 
management and 
the community in 
the funding of 
essential drugs 
The most 
effective health 
interventions 
were priced 
below private 
sector charges 
and cross- 
subsidized 
through higher 
mark-up and 
higher co-
payments on 
Sub-Saharan 
countries that 
adopted the 
Bamako Initiative 
employed phased 
scaling up; 
several countries 
most notably 
Benin, Mali and 
Rwanda achieved 
significant 
Bamako health 
centres 
implemented an 
integrated 
minimum- health-
care package in 
order to meet 
basic community 
health needs 
(Ebrahim, 1993) 
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(Ebrahim, 1993). lower priority 
interventions 
results. 
Decentralized 
Government 
funding 
Empowerment of 
district and 
provincial health 
centres in health 
decision making 
to make them 
more receptive to 
the needs of their 
communities. 
Programmes have 
multiple 
information, 
accounting and 
reporting systems 
which 
compromise on 
technical 
efficiency. (Buse 
and Walt, 1996). 
The health sector 
is generally 
underfinanced 
and is hugely 
dependent on 
donors (Ali, 
2014).  
The health sector 
is generally 
underfinanced by 
and is hugely 
dependent on 
donors (Ali, 
2014). 
Ability to reach 
marginalised 
communities. 
Government 
funding initiative 
where budgetary 
allocations are 
meant to ensure 
that citizens 
receive desirable 
basic health care. 
Coordinated 
basket 
funding  
There is poor 
governance of 
budgeted funds as 
there is a higher 
suspicion of 
misappropriation 
of committed 
public funds 
(Easterly, 2008).  
Technical 
inefficiency is 
inherent since 
there is a services 
overlap (Buse 
and Walt, 1996). 
Health officials 
are obliged to 
meet successive 
times when one 
gathering would 
suffice. 
Communication 
of guidelines and 
standards to all 
staff and partners 
in accessible 
formats. 
Results Based 
Finance 
Health 
institutions are 
given substantial 
decision rights 
over their 
resources 
To improve 
allocative 
efficiency, there 
is need to 
significantly 
increase 
government 
spending and 
purchasing in the 
health sector 
The sustainability 
of RBF funding 
in developing 
countries seems 
secure as it is 
now recognised 
as part of a 
national health 
financing strategy 
(Bonfrer, 2015). 
Flexibility to 
adjust plans in the 
light of 
unforeseen 
events/barriers 
through jointly 
agreed 
milestones.  
2.7 Preconditions for Health care Financing Models  
User fees are a precondition that sustains the health delivery system. User fees alternatively 
known as out-of-pocket health financing accounts for 60 per cent of all health care spending in 
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low income countries and only 20 per cent in high income countries (Schieber et al., 2006). In 
Cambodia, high out of pocket spending and low levels of utilisation have impeded the expansion 
of coverage and improvement in health outcomes (Ensor et al., 2017). The introduction of user 
fees in the African health delivery system was inspired by widespread downward pressure on 
public expenditure and dwindling aid flows during the late 1980s (Yates, 2006). Economic 
recession and structural adjustment programs enforced by the IMF led to the culmination of user 
fees in developing countries especially in Africa (Olmen et al., 2012). The economic 
justifications for charging user fees are that they rationalise usage of health care services 
inasmuch as they primarily deter unnecessary service usage by households (Savedoff, 2011); 
health care providers retain them partially or totally (Quaye, 2007); they shift the responsibility 
of health care financing from the government to the public through a cost sharing mechanism 
that suits both donors and governments (Yates, 2006) and they act as a cost recovery mechanism 
to ease pressure on tax-based health financing. 
In instances were user fees have been abolished; the challenge has been the development of an 
alternative health financing mechanism that does not strain the fiscal space. In 2006, Burundi put 
in place a systemic health financing through the combination of user fee exemptions for pregnant 
women and children under 5 and performance based financing. The systemic combination 
approach in Burundi appear to have worked since it created a formal channel for replacing 
revenue from user fee exemptions. An incentive scheme was put in place to counter staff 
demotivation associated with attending to huge volumes following the scraping of user fees 
(Musango et al., 2013). 
However, proponents of the pro-poor approach to health care access assert that many countries 
have put in place mechanisms to protect the poor and vulnerable by abolishing or reducing user 
fees (Musango et al., 2013). The abolishment of user fees works effectively when there are 
system wide investments in health care. In March 2001, the Government of Uganda scraped user 
fees with the hope that there would be improvements in access and utilisation of health services 
especially among the poor, reduce out-of-pocket expenditure on health and eventually eradicate 
poverty. Efforts were made to increase funds allocated to primary health care. Unfortunately, 
close to 80% of these funds were spent on wages. Nevertheless, there was no noticeable 
improvements in health access among the poor (Musango et al., 2013).    
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From this point of view, user fees play a role in ensuring sustainability of health care systems 
(Savedoff, 2011). However, effective private sector partnerships with some moderate control on 
prices can help to ensure the delivery of quality health services (Musango et al., 2013).    
In the wake of the challenges posed by out-of-pocket approach to health care finance, the notion 
of social insurance and private public partnerships was developed. Social health insurance pools 
both the health risk and the people on one hand and the contributions of individuals, households’ 
enterprises and the government on the other hand (Akortsu, 2013). In the Zimbabwean context, a 
social health insurance was initiated in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic and culminated in 
the introduction of the Aids Levy which is 3% of an individuals' tax payable and is mandatory 
(ZIMRA, 2013). Health financing through the development of social health insurance is 
generally recognised as a powerful method to achieve universal coverage with adequate financial 
resources for all against health care costs (Akortsu, 2013). 
Private funding of health care is based on premiums paid by members. Monthly subscriptions 
paid by members depend on their risk exposure (Green, 2007). The success of private funding of 
health care is based on the opportunity to avoid huge out-of-pocket expenditure Private health 
insurers pool health risks across space and time for a large number of policy holders who differ 
in their risk exposures (Johannessen et al., 2014). Premiums paid by an individual are shared 
between the employee and the employer. In some instances, the employer wholly meets the 
health costs and insurance agents manage the premiums fund. Government may subsidize the 
cost of private health insurance using tax credits or tax relief. In Zimbabwe, private health 
insurance costs are tax deductible (ZIMRA, 2013).  In many lower-and middle-income countries, 
private health insurance may be the only form of risk pooling available and it usually provides 
principal coverage to those in the formal sector, with private policies frequently subsidized by 
employers (Akortsu, 2013). 
Despite private health funding being tax deductible, it is not all encompassing since it 
marginalises the poor. In essence, private funding of health care affects the accessibility of the 
same by the poor (Sithole, 2013). It only recognises the formal sector where there are formal 
arrangements between the employee and the employer to subscribe to a private funding of health 
care scheme. Unfortunately, the marginalised and vulnerable members of the society are more 
likely not formally employed since they depend on menial and non-formal modes of income 
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generation. As such this significant segment of the population is excluded from the private 
funding of health care scheme. To reinforce this assertion, Burke et al. (2013) notes that about 
14% of South African citizens use private health insurance, the remainder rely on public sector 
health care which is free of charge to the unemployed, the poor and children.  
Public private partnerships (PPP) are an alternative form of health finance, which is a 
prerequisite for a functioning health care system. Health partners such as multinationals, bilateral 
and multilateral donors provide budgetary support to recipient governments’ treasury through 
earmarked funds for specific health projects (Akortsu, 2013). The criterion for PPP is that public 
services remain under the control of the public sector. Public private partnerships in health care 
finance are essential as they increase service technical efficiency, quality and accountability. 
These arrangements are seen as a way to encourage private players to invest in health care 
projects that lack public funding (Johannessen et al., 2014). External assistance accounts for 
about seven percent of all health spending in developing countries and is not a significant source 
of health financing in developed countries (Schneider et al, 2006).  
Despite the conceptual appeal of external assistance, the down side of this approach is that in 
countries where health is not a priority, health finance is compromised and the gains of 
budgetary support earmarked for achieving health targets will not be met. In addition, the private 
sector is inspired by the profit motive, is risk averse and is less likely to invest in poor 
communities as they narrow their margins. Businesses are ill-prepared to service the low income 
market as they lack working experience with the poor clients (Johannessen et al., 2014). 
Zimbabwe is one such country where health is not prioritised, where national budgets are 
concerned, it appears that the defence Ministry takes precedence over the health Ministry 
(Sithole, 2013). This is likely to compromise health outcomes. 
The preceding health financing approaches are the dominant ones in most health care set-ups. 
Alternative health financing approaches are meant to complement the existing health financing 
approaches. Public health institutions usually raise finance by undertaking other activities that 
are not directly related to the provision of health care. These might include the operation of a 
cafeteria, gift shop, space or equipment rentals, parking fees and research grants (Akortsu, 2013). 
Most teaching hospitals usually finance their activities through research grants as well as funding 
from pharmaceutical companies to test new drugs and products (Lane and Nixon, 2001). 
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Advanced economies such as the USA make use of marketable investments as alternative 
sources of finance. These includes trade in mutual trusts, stocks and bonds on the stock exchange 
(Akortsu, 2013).  
Nevertheless, different hospitals have different strategies were the use of alternative sources of 
health care financing is concerned. Some hospitals prefer to invest in the stock market that 
provide higher returns at higher risks while others invest in more conservative fixed rate of 
return investments such as bond and money market funds (Akortsu, 2013). Having looked at 
various health financing approaches that are available, it is imperative that the current study  also 
focus attention on health financing models that underlie the health care financing approaches. 
2.8 Country experiences 
2.8.1 Key Success Factors for Results Based Financing Implementation in Rwanda 
Rwanda is one of the countries in Africa considered to have successfully embarked and 
implemented the RBF framework on a nationwide scale within its health system (WHO, 2015). 
Every administrative unit from the village level to the ministries attest to a performance contract 
within its hierarchy (Renaud and Semasaka, 2014). The RBF was introduced to the Rwandan 
health system during 2001 and 2002 and it was up scaled to become a national programme in 
2008. The successful implementation of the RBF in Rwanda was assessed through a well-
documented and credible impact evaluation and it found impressive results on the volume and 
quality of health services (Sithole, 2013). 
As a country emerging from a war experience, it was expedient to hold warring parties together 
for the common good, as such there was unwavering commitment towards the RBF initiative. 
Post war trauma can be asserted as one of the building blocks towards the remarkable success of 
the RBF initiative in Rwanda. The most critical factor that contributed to success of RBF in 
Rwanda was strong political will, full support and commitment by the Rwandan government 
(World Bank, 2010). The Government allowed the implementation of mechanisms that enabled 
transparency, accountability and responsiveness. In addition, there was close cooperation with 
the donor community who provided the bulk of the funds to finance the health system. This 
helped to reduce the mistrust and suspicion that is usually associated with government and 
donors in the management of funds (Basinga et al, 2011). 
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The Rwandan RBF programme had a positive impact on quality of health care (World Bank, 
2014). Information on RBF was widely disseminated to all the stakeholders in the health system 
as some sense of ownership was developed. Target beneficiaries particularly those in the rural 
areas were encouraged to visit health institutions for health care. There was a widespread buy-in 
from the critical stakeholders who included the government, health care providers and the target 
beneficiaries (Basinga et al, 2011). 
Differences in the implementation of the RBF between Rwanda and Zimbabwe is that in Rwanda 
there was zeal in social programs that could unite the nation since the country was emerging 
from a devastating war. Whereas the RBF was first introduced in Zimbabwe in 2010 three 
decades after gaining political and economic independence. The resounding and apparent 
perception in Zimbabwe is that the budgetary allotment towards the Defence Ministry versus the 
Health Ministry is too much for a peaceful country. As Paganini (2004) rightfully quips, it 
appears that in the wake of the fiscal deficits facing the Zimbabwean government, “…the 
government financial allocation to public health, in the best cases, is barely enough to pay the 
salary of the staff.” Despite all the odds that were cast against it, Rwanda appears to operate a 
robust result based finance programme than Zimbabwe.  
2.8.2 Key Success Factors for Results Based Financing Implementation in Burundi 
Burundi like Rwanda is a country ravaged by war hence leading to massive brain drain of health 
personnel. Health indicators were also dismal with a child mortality of 176/1 000 and a maternal 
mortality ratio of 615/100 000 (World Bank, 2010). Against this background RBF was 
introduced in the Burundi health system. Similar to the Rwanda case, there was political 
commitment towards RBF. In 2006, the President of Burundi declared a policy of free health 
care for pregnant women and children less than five years of age and RBF pilot programmes 
were introduced in Bubanza and Cankuzo provinces by Cordaid with financing from the Dutch 
government and the European Union (EU). By 2009 RBF had spread the entirety of Burundi 
with support from NGOs such as Health Net International-TPO and the Swiss Development 
Cooperation (World Bank, 2010). 
The implementation of the RBF was expedited by political will, financial and moral support 
rendered from the government and donor community (World Bank, 2010). There was also buy-in 
from all the relevant stakeholders, which include government, donors and the target 
29 
beneficiaries. This fostered a spirit of ownership and the will to succeed which is crucial to 
programmes such as RBF, which require widespread participation. The Rwanda and Burundi 
experiences show that political will, inclusiveness, transparency and government support are 
some of the critical conditions that must be in place to make RBF successful in the health 
system. Further, there should be buy-in from all the stakeholders as a way of engendering a 
strong sense of ownership.  
2.9 Conceptual framework: Performance-based financing 
This study utilises performance-based financing as its conceptual framework in assessing the 
effectiveness of RBF as the emerging preferred health care financing model, and as a mechanism 
by which health providers within a health system are funded on the basis of their performance 
(Meesen, Soucat, 2011). Grittner (2013) contrasts the concept of performance- based financing 
with line item approach, which finances the health system through the provision of inputs such as 
drugs. The underlying philosophy underpinning performance-based financing is that health 
funding should be closely linked to outcomes. Meesen et al., (2011) argue that the concept of 
performance-based financing from which RBF is derived aims among other things, to improve 
efficiency, greater accountability and to bring comparable results to inputs invested in the health 
systems. Within this purview, it is essential to note that the performance based financing 
framework requires a moderate to unlimited supply of resources and a complex network of 
organizations to implement which may not be readily available in many developing countries. 
With respect to efficiency, performance-based financing is said to help in improving allocative 
and productive efficiency. Allocative efficiency is a result of enhanced stewardship of resources 
on the part of the recipients and ensuring resources are available to those who can yield better 
results to health investments on the part of the financiers. In terms of productive efficiency, 
health staff is motivated to utilize resources in a way that ensures desired results are achieved at 
minimum cost especially in remote areas where resource scarcity is a main issue that affects 
health services provision. Basinga et al., (2011) also highlight the fact that performance-based 
financing can promote technical efficiency within the health systems by increasing the 
productivity of health personnel. Since health personnel are rewarded on the basis of their 
performance, it therefore implies that they are likely to improve their way of doing things, hence 
achieving technical efficiency. By increasing the income of health personnel performance-based 
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financing acts as a motivator, that reduces the flight of health personnel to the so-called greener 
pastures and also encourage them to work in remote areas. 
Performance-based financing provides a framework for verifying results and achievement of set 
targets within the health system which promotes accountability of health personnel to health 
funds providers, and through community participation, to the general public of health systems 
(Soeters and Griffiths, 2003). Improved accountability is an issue in the health systems of low-
income countries where accountability to end-users is often low. Sustainability has also been 
linked to accountability. The transmission mechanism is such that a health delivery system that 
lacks accountability may fail to be sustainable in the long run, as it lacks the necessary checks 
responsibility centres as well as appropriate checks and balance to give it the necessary balance 
that in requires to run for longer terms. 
2.10 Summary of Literature Reviewed 
Overall picture of the literature reviewed is summarised by the following conceptual diagram: 
Conceptual diagram giving overview of literature reviewed in line with discussed concepts and 
research objectives 
In the process of critically comparing health financing models, the researcher focused on trends 
in health systems thinking drawing insights from the era of the Alta Ama Declaration and its 
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emphasis on social action; austerity measures that came with the New Public Management 
philosophy and global change in health systems actors that saw the emergence of private 
financiers such as the Melinda and Bill Gates foundation. Literature also reviewed the departure 
from mechanical thinking of the health sector as a holistic interplay of a multiple actors to 
systems thinking perspective and its emphasis on results. Various health care financing models 
were reviewed. Amongst them is the Standard model with its emphasis on equity and allocative 
efficiency and the scraping user fees to promote accessibility by the vulnerable members of 
community. The Bamako Initiative was biased towards promoting community buy-in in health 
related matters as well as making resources available, decentralization of health delivery and 
scraping user fees. The decentralized government-funding model focused on empowering local 
authorities to manage the health delivery process within their specific environmental contexts. 
The Coordinated Basket Funding Model pools resources from multiple players in the health 
sector, with the central treasury managing the fund. However, this model is critiqued on the 
grounds of reported cases of misappropriation of committed health funds by governments. 
Finally, the Results Based Finance model is being preferred widely in developing countries like 
Burundi, Rwanda and as recently introduced in Zimbabwe. It emphasises health funding on the 
basis of performance. These health-financing models were reviewed and discussed within the 
context of economic framings such as governance, sustainability, accountability, efficiency and 
effectiveness as well as equity and inclusiveness. For health financing models to operate well 
within the purview of KPI’s there some prerequisites. The identified preconditions included the 
charging of user fees to rationalize usage of health services, government support and 
commitment, the presence of PPP’s as well as resource availability. In the final analysis, the 
operation of distinct health financing models within the context of KPI’s and preconditions 
determines the extent to which each particular health-financing model can achieve specific health 
outcomes.  
Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.0 Research Approach and Strategy 
This study intends to extend theory on health financing by applying the RBF notion in the 
Zimbabwean context, which is a country facing resource constraints. It is based on a broad 
theoretical framework of health care financing that has informed the research questions therefore 
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qualitative research was relevant in answering the how and why questions which are the primary 
focus. Qualitative data emphasize the use of words rather than quantification therefore it 
produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of 
quantification (Anderson and Arsenalt, 2001) 
A qualitative inductive study was used to further develop theory through analysing the 
functionality of health financing models within a dispensation of resource constraints.	   An 
inductive approach was utilised to enable analysis of huge volumes of textual data from 
transcribed interviews and identify underlying themes from raw data that emerges from semi-
structured interviews. However, inductive qualitative analysis has been often criticised for its 
lack of robustness in comparison to other analytical methods for theory development. 
Nevertheless, an inductive approach is commonly recognised as fit for purpose, easy and a 
straightforward approach to qualitative data analysis.  
Since RBF implementation in the health sector in Zimbabwe is an on-going program, 2015 was 
used as the upper limit on quantitative data collection using documents review, beliefs and 
perceptions in the health sector were collected up-to the current date of data collection. 
3.1 Research Design 
This study adopted an inductive research approach to explore the effectiveness of health care 
financing in Zimbabwe using a semi-structured protocol to explore health systems thinking and 
how best health systems can be funded in a developing country context facing resource 
constraints. From similar country experiences in Rwanda and Burundi, lessons learnt on how 
RBF has ensured attainment of favourable health outcomes was used as a yardstick for detailed 
contextual analysis of health care financing in Zimbabwe with particular reference to the RBF 
program. Key factors for successful RBF implementation as learnt from Rwanda and Burundi 
were pivotal in assessing whether Zimbabwe has minimum conditions to support the operational 
framework of RBF. 
Qualitatively, in-depth interviews provided the detailed analysis of how health systems thinking 
influence the achievement of health outcomes and explored from respondents’ experiences how 
the operational environment of health care financing could be improved for sustained results in 
health welfare of Zimbabwe. Peculiar insights specific to the Zimbabwean context on the 
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application of the RBF were gained to promote health systems strengthening and achieve 
desirable health outcomes.  
Quantitative data was gathered largely through surveys and documents review and was meant to 
measure gains made towards the achievement of health outcomes before and post RBF 
implementation in Zimbabwe. It targeted the second research objective, ‘to analyse how the RBF 
model is performing in terms of governance, sustainability, equity and allocative efficiency 
within the health system in Zimbabwe’. As such the study used analytical methods to ascertain 
this progress through the use of percentiles and trends analysis in achieving health outcomes 
such as child and infant mortality rates, maternal mortality and basic vaccination coverage. 
Qualitative data complemented quantitative dimensions to unlock gains made towards the 
achievement of health outcomes and the evolution of the Zimbabwean health system. As such 
qualitative interview transcripts were meant to partially resolve the first research sub-question, 
“how health systems thinking influenced the achievement of health outcomes” as well as to 
predominantly resolve the third sub-research question, “Does Zimbabwe have the prerequisites 
that support the operation of the RBF model”  
The unit of analysis in this study was composed of the Zimbabwean public health system and 
units of observation were the primary health service providers mostly in remote rural set-ups 
where RBF was piloted in 2010.  
3.2 Sampling  
The main research objective of the current study was to evaluate how RBF is performing in the 
Zimbabwean context to be the preferred health financing model post the MDGs era. This model 
was to be tested within a dispensation of limited resource availability. The target population was 
made up of health personnel and donor agency representatives at district, health centre and 
provincial level in areas of RBF implementation. 
For qualitative methods of data collection, the target population was composed of individuals in 
management with influence on policy and determining the implementation framework of RBF in 
Zimbabwe both from the donor community and MoHCW especially those whose primary area of 
focus was rural health care. Interview respondents were initially selected on availability and 
voluntary inclusion in the study and snowballing was used to include possible target respondents, 
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especially those 65 years and above, who may have retired, but had significant insights on health 
care financing and health systems thinking in Zimbabwe probably dating before independence in 
1980. Medical officers, Health Administrators, officials from Cordaid, officials from the 
Ministry of Health and Child Welfare and representatives from the donor community with 
special interest in health were also interviewed, for a comprehensive understanding of RBF 
implementation in Zimbabwe, how the financing model works and limitations in implementation 
to harvest full results from the program. 
 It was imperative that the study makes use of a purposive sampling approach to obtain 
quantitative data because the researcher had to target respondents who were likely informative 
and had capacity to respond, as questionnaire respondents were limited to access to email and 
proximity to Harare. The target population was made up of health personnel and donor agency 
representatives at district, health centre and provincial level in areas of RBF implementation.  
The samples were extracted from 18 rural districts in which RBF was first piloted in 2010. These 
18 districts are well dispersed across 8 provinces in Zimbabwe excluding the Harare and 
Bulawayo Metropolitan Provinces. They are illustrated in the Zimbabwean map below. 
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Figure 3.1: RBF Sampling Districts 
Within these eighteen districts, respondents were chosen on the basis that they had either, a 
direct interface with the RBF program or had direct decision making authority with regard to 
RBF implementation. The intention was to extract the most relevant account of RBF 
implementation, how it is influencing positive health outcomes as well as uncover preconditions 
that promote effective health financing in the Zimbabwean context. 
3.3 Data Collection  
This study utilised the semi-structured interviews with a list of themes to match themes in the 
questionnaire. Semi-structured interviews meant to explore ideas, beliefs, perceptions and 
opinions of respondents with respect to evolution of health systems thinking, history and 
performance of preceding health financing models before RBF and performance of RBF against 
governance, sustainability, equity, allocative efficiency and effectiveness. The use of semi-
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structured interviews enabled the researcher to probe for detail, triangulate data collected through 
questionnaires and seek clarification of the content of questionnaire results. 
It was imperative to minimise respondent bias, and as such the researcher interviewed at least ten 
respondents that were composed of nursing officers, medical officers, health administrators, 
policy makers, and members of the donor community. This enabled the researcher to encompass 
a broad perspective with regards to coverage of research questions. Interview questions were 
rephrased for clarity through a pre-testing with selected health personnel, which gave the 
researcher an opportunity to probe and explore themes under study further, resulting in the 
collection of rich and detailed data.  
Moreover, since RBF in Zimbabwe is a new phenomenon, semi structured interviews led to the 
exploration of areas and ideas not previously imagined by the researcher. In-depth interviews 
were held with high-ranking officials from Zimbabwe’s Ministry of Health and Child Care and 
representatives from the donors’ community in partnering to implement RBF since they possess 
experience and knowledge in health systems financing spanning many years. In-depth interviews 
were supposed to answer the question on how RBF has been implemented, how health systems 
thinking and health care financing in Zimbabwe had evolved and whether it can be the preferred 
health service-funding model to institute health service reform in Zimbabwe. Participants’ 
responses revealed the level of appreciation of the Zimbabwean health delivery system, how it 
operates, its challenges and propositions on how the environment can be made more receptive of 
aid. 
The researcher identified key informants who were interviewed under the semi structured 
interview sessions based on level of authority either in the donor community or public health 
system structures (assuming higher authority came from experience) and depth of knowledge 
sought from the study. An invitation to participate in the interview was sent out to target 
respondents, and a written consent was acquired before commencement of the interview. 
Interviews were not recorded since respondents were concerned about their anonymity 
considering the political fragility of donor funding to governments, bureaucracy in seeking 
clearance and inaccessibility of government officials as some of the respondents noted. As such 
the interviewer took notes during the interview. Additional information was collected from RBF 
program specific documents and internal records.  
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Questionnaires were designed in line with the research objectives of the study and with matching 
themes to interview schedules. Participation in the survey utilised implied consent to participate. 
Clearance was sought and granted by the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare as well as the 
Medicine Research Council of Zimbabwe for permission to access the target respondents in the 
target areas and a list of respondents with their respective email addresses was compiled.  
The study evaluated the implementation of the RBF framework using documents analysis to 
gather baseline data, and comparing pre-and post-RBF implementation time periods. Limited 
funding and time resources implied that the researcher relied more on the availability of good 
quality secondary data that was utilised to form a good benchmark for analysis. The year 2010 
was selected as the baseline year for the current study. Taking cognisance of the fact that RBF 
implementation in Zimbabwe is an on-going program, data was collected to the current date of 
responding to interviews and secondary data used 2015 as the upper limit. The baseline analysis 
benchmark used similar indicators used in the survey questionnaire to measure development 
results and data gaps were complimented with in-depth interviews. 
3.4 Data Analysis 
Data collected through document analysis and interviews were analysed using a thematic 
analysis approach to qualitatively analyse, identify and report recurring patterns emerging from 
people’s experiences (Braun and Clarke, 2006).  Interview data was collected in written format 
and the data analysis entailed a word-for-word transcription of interviews. Constructs and 
patterns were taken note of in each individual case for case validity and also in relation to 
existing literature. In the process of analysing interview findings, a tabular format was utilised 
whereby similar themes were grouped and analysed in order to distil the common themes 
emerging from the data. The table included the findings, the details of the response as well as 
representative quotes that encompassed a direct link to research questions and were 
comprehensive in capturing all the information from other respondents.  
The main purpose was to look for broader patterns in data and this was achieved through a 
rigorous process of data familiarisation, coding, theme development and revision. The main 
themes distilled from respondents were meant to analyse how health care financing has 
performed in terms of governance, sustainability, equity, effectiveness and allocative efficiency, 
as well as to examine how health systems thinking influenced the achievement of health 
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outcomes. The main advantage of thematic analysis in this study was that it was simple, took less 
time and was theoretically flexible because the researcher intended to collect people’s views, 
experiences, belief and perceptions on a particular phenomenon facilitating the researcher to 
organise and describe given data in richer and informative detail.  
The researcher followed a deductive approach to thematic analysis, because there were research 
questions, which already identify the main themes, which were used to group the data, and also, 
this approach was feasible within the time and resources available. Some of the themes that have 
been proposed in this study included governance, sustainability, effectiveness, allocative 
efficiency and equity of RBF implementation in Zimbabwe, whether it has achieved desired 
health outcomes and how effective it has been as a fairly new health care financing model in the 
Zimbabwean context. 
The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) was used to analyse responses from the 
questionnaire pertaining to how health systems thinking influenced the achievement of health 
outcomes as well as to analyse how health care financing had performed in terms of governance, 
sustainability, equity, effectiveness and allocative efficiency of RBF. Data were analysed into 
graphs, charts, cross tabulations and descriptive statistics to shows patterns and trends in data 
collected.  
According USAID (2012), when development interventions are carried out efficiently, 
effectively and equitably, responsive and sustainable health services lead to positive health 
outcomes. The proposed themes under study to evaluate RBF implementation in Zimbabwe are 
therefore governance, sustainability, allocative efficiency and effectiveness and equity and 
inclusiveness whose selection is primarily based on the OECD Development Effectiveness 
Criteria. Key performance indicators under each theme have been identified based on availability 
of data, ease of access and relevance to provide adequate data to evaluate RBF against the 
identified themes.	  	  
Key performance indicators for governance included share of positions that are vacant, stock out 
rates for essential drugs, share of budgeted funds that are executed and share of health facilities 
that receive supervisory visits in accordance with national guidelines. Allocative efficiency and 
effectiveness were assessed through the percentage of government health budget allocated to 
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primary care, the percentage of government expenditure directed to primary care and personnel 
expenditure as a total of recurrent health expenditure. KPI’s for sustainability included the 
government health expenditure as a percentage of GDP. The percentage of health expenditure 
financed by donors, the total per capita expenditure on health as well as sources of financing for 
health and their relative shares of total expenditure. Finally, equity and inclusiveness was 
measured through community engagement in setting health priorities, access to primary health 
centres, involvement of marginalised and excluded people and communication of guidelines and 
standards to all staff and partners in accessible formats.  
3.5 Validity 
This study observed the rules of research validity and is mainly guided by construct validity, of 
which the construct here is the initial concept, notion, question or hypothesis that determines 
which data is to be gathered and how it is to be gathered. Validity was mainly determined by 
asking a series of questions in the pre-testing phase to determine whether questions asked were 
valid, measuring what they were intended to measure, appropriate for the target population and 
whether they were comprehensive enough to collect all the information needed to address the 
purpose and goals of the study. 
In the study, the researcher improved face validity by ensuring that lead questions in the 
questionnaire did not influence respondents to answer in a specific way. Designing a similar 
questionnaire that was administered to all respondents ensured concurrent validity. A single 
blinded technique was utilised in order to improve internal validity. This entailed that 
participants were deliberately interviewed separately so that the views of the dominant members 
could not influence the views of others. In other words, internal validity enabled the participants 
not to behave in a certain way that they might have thought to be expected of them.  
Saunders et al., (2009) notes, to ensure internal validity, ‘researchers look for other relevant 
evidence that supports the answers found in the questionnaire’. Interviews complemented 
findings from the questionnaire to ensure internal validity. However, external validity was 
limited in this mixed method approach as it was not intended to produce a theory which is 
generalizable to all populations but is with specific reference to the Zimbabwean context.  
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3.6 Reliability 
Threats to reliability can emerge from participant error or bias. To increase reliability in the 
current study, the researcher made use of a mechanical way of tests and re-tests on the 
questionnaire to ensure that the research instrument reduced errors in measurement and yielded 
consistent findings. In trying to derive consistent findings, all the respondents were given a 
similar questionnaire to complete on their own, some of the questions were standard structured 
questions were respondents simply ticked a response that closely suits their perceptions for 
uniformity. Triangulating the two data collections instruments, though the combination of the 
interview and the questionnaire enabled the study to counter weaknesses of either data collection 
method. Moreover, a pilot study was done to ensure the reliability of research results since 
identified ambiguities and weaknesses were corrected in the pre-testing phase. Over and above 
this, an internal consistency method through the Cronbach’s Coefficient was used to endure the 
reliability of research findings. The Cronbach’s Alpha measurement of internal consistency was 
extracted through the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 23. A reliability 
coefficient of 0.7 and above was considered acceptable as it showed that various questions in the 
questionnaire are highly consistent in trying to resolve the research objectives of the study.   
3.7 Ethics 
The researcher ensured that the respondents had the right to self-determination. Participants were 
debriefed and given adequate information regarding the research; this enabled them to develop 
the power of free choice enabling them to consent voluntarily to participate in the research or 
decline participation. As such the research sought verbal permission from would-be participants; 
the purpose of the study was explained to participants and the researcher read the statement 
introducing to the topic under study before getting their consent to participate. Participants were 
informed of their rights to withdraw from the study any time. Written consent was sought and 
granted by the University of Cape Town as well as from the MRCZ.  
Also, the researcher ensured that participants enjoyed the right to confidentiality. The researcher 
read the statement of confidentiality before the start of interviews, data collected was used for 
academic purposes only and all information was treated in strictest confidence where interviews 
transcripts and questionnaires were destroyed after data collection and analysis. In guaranteeing 
the right to privacy, the researcher maintained privacy on participants’ feelings, beliefs or 
altitudes arose from this study by ensuring that raw data was protected from unauthorized 
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persons, not shared and no names were linked to the data. To this end the researcher pledged to 
respect the views of the respondents. Any information derived from the respondents was held in 
the strictest confidence and pseudonyms were used to protect the respondents in the final write-
up of the study. The data was used purely for academic purposes. 
Chapter 4: Data Presentation, Analysis and Discussion of Findings 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter includes data presentation, analysis and discussion of research findings on the topic 
of rethinking health care financing models in the Zimbabwean health sector. Information 
presented in this chapter has been streamlined to respond to research questions as set in the first 
chapter. Demographic data is illustrated mainly through the use of cross tabulations and 
frequency tables. All quantitative responses have been processed for internal reliability through 
the Cronbach’s Alpha statistical technique in order to ascertain the extent of variation in the 
questions posed to respondents. Basically, the quantitative dimension was meant to partially 
resolve the first research sub-question in conjunction with the qualitative dimension. Following 
the dictates of the quantitative dimension, the study utilised analytical methods through the use 
of percentiles and trends analysis to ascertain progress towards achieving health outcomes such 
as child and infant mortality rates, maternal mortality and basic vaccination coverage. On the 
other hand, the qualitative dimension was predominantly used to resolve the second and third 
sub-research objectives. The key limitation of this study is researcher bias and narrowly focusing 
on RBF. Future research may assess RBF against competing health frameworks or across sectors 
to determine if it is the panacea to health financing in Zimbabwe and where it can be best used to 
achieve maximum results. 
It is imperative to note the operational context of RBF as emerging issues from the data collected 
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Zimbabwe has been plagued by close to two decades of 
economic decline, massive migration of intellectuals across sectors to the diaspora, which have 
crippled local industry and service provision broadly. The country is poorly ranked in terms of 
corruption (12th most corrupt country and 11th in Africa in 2016 according to Transparency 
International) and ease of doing business (161/190 on World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
2017 Index) and this have created a bridge of mistrust between the Zimbabwean government and 
the donor community, hence the need to partner with CORDAID to handle all payments and 
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acquisition of resources under the RBF program. It is also noteworthy to mention the disconnect 
between Zimbabwe and the donor community post 2000, after the IMF and World sanctions in 
2002, and how this exacerbated poor service delivery and economic performance of the country. 
The introduction of RBF was one of the major milestones of donor efforts to rebuild and reform 
the health sector, amid donor reengagement processes and the global outcry on aid effectiveness, 
encompassing the Paris Declaration principles on aid effectiveness.  
The Zimbabwean public system suffers from a surfeit of bureaucracy in accessing information 
and public documents, which limits access, and analysis of secondary data and most importantly, 
inhibits drawing lessons from past experiences for future development. The researcher faced 
several problems in accessing respondents due to lack of trust and transparency within 
authorities in the sector, bureaucracy in gaining permission to carry out the study, lack of clear 
structures and ambiguity in authority and general fear to grant access to information which is 
supposed to be public anyway. There is generally lack of commitment as some senior officials 
noted, to adequately finance health programs like RBF. Commitment should be shown in 
increasing budget allocation to health for sustained health sector outcomes and not commitment 
to spend donor funds only.  
4.1 Questionnaire Response and Analysis 
This study utilised questionnaires and interviews as the main data collection instruments. 
Questionnaires were self-administered, either through emails or personally by the researcher in 
order to enhance the response rate from respondents across the 18 districts in which RBF was 
being implemented from 2010. A total of thirty-five completed questionnaires were collected 
from the sixty anticipated responses. The response rate from paper questionnaires was better 
compared to emailed questionnaires which took long to get responses and several follow up 
emails had to be sent The highest response rate came from nursing officers probably because 
they are the front-line officers who maintain the point of contact with recipients of the health 
delivery system. These front-line officers were easy to get access to since minimal protocol was 
demanded hence the high response rate. The donor community had a response rate of eighty 
percent since they were RBF implementing partners. Health administrators and Policy Makers 
had a lower response rate due to the protocols required to get access to them.  
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4.2 Research Findings 
4.2.1 Is RBF the panacea for health financing in Zimbabwe?  
In order to determine whether RBF is producing favourable results, it was imperative to focus on 
the pre-and post RBF periods. Findings are shown in the Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.2: Pre-and Post-Results Based Finance thinking 
Pre-RBF thinking Detail Representative Quote 
The government 
adopted a socialistic 
free-health-for-all 
approach upon 
gaining independence 
The dominant health 
system thinking in 
Zimbabwean, prior to the 
implementation of RBF 
was based on socialistic 
principles, the government 
was the major player in 
health funding before the 
IMF intervened with the 
establishment of ESAP.  
This culminated in the 
enforcement of user fees 
following the dictates of 
the Bamako Initiative to 
access health care 
services.  
The government played a 
minimal role in health 
care provision as 
capitalism in health 
provision was gaining 
“At independence, the government pledged 
free health access for the first ten years 
since the political climate was favouring 
socialistic principles (Standard Model 
approach to health care finance). However, 
due to the economic downturn in the 1990s, 
government was given preconditions for 
receiving assistance from IMF under ESAP, 
which encouraged reduction of government 
expenditure on health. This led to a funding 
gap, which led to the introduction of user 
fees Bamako approach to health care 
financing). This also led to the 
mushrooming of various medical aid 
societies and private practice in the medical 
sector. (Decentralised Government Funding 
Model).” (Policy Maker 1) 
We inherited a National Health Service 
system from Britain where people pay taxes 
and the government fund health. 
Development partners were there but 
government was taking care of health care 
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traction. The deregulation 
of the market saw private 
sector providers playing a 
significant role in the 
health system. 
(Coordinated Basket Funding Model). 
In the 1990s came ESAP, with reforms such 
as privatisations and introduction of user 
fees, contracting out of services and 
introduction of the private sector.” (Health 
Administrator 2). 
 “For the post-colonial era, key objective 
has been to make sure that issues of equity 
are addressed, government had to adopt a 
free health to all approach to correct 
colonial inequities such as around access to 
health.	  (Health Administrator 1) 
Post-RBF thinking Detail Representative Quote 
Strengthening of the 
health delivery 
system, through 
supplementing health 
budgetary allocations 
with the view to 
improve health 
outcomes. 
The implementation of the 
RBF was prompted 
particularly by the need to 
strengthen the health 
delivery system. The idea 
was initiated by the World 
Bank  
“The need to strengthen the health delivery 
system created an impetus for the 
implementation of RBF. The government 
has however been implementing results 
based management in various sectors 
including health, education amongst 
others.” (Policy Maker 1). 
“RBF was proposed by the World Bank, to 
respond to specific needs in high priority 
areas of maternal and child health care. 
There were high maternal and child 
mortality rates at primary health level. The 
government could not fund primary health 
care adequately, with a limited fiscus, which 
saw budget allocations, but with 
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disbursement challenges. Implementation is 
different from other programs elsewhere; it 
was designed to fit into ministry of health 
priorities. (Medical Officer 2). 
There was an over 
reliance on the role of 
the government in the 
health delivery 
system 
Health KPI’s such as child 
and infant mortality rate 
were declining owing to 
the government’s failure 
to keep up with population 
growth. Basic drugs were 
out of reach in many 
health centres.   
“Prior to the implementation of the RBF 
some key performance health indicators 
such as the child and infant mortality rate 
were in the red. Though the government 
played a pivotal role in health delivery, 
exponential population growth made health 
coverage across the country a challenge.  
(Policy Maker 2). 
Apparently, the health system was falling 
apart, with health centres not having access 
to basic drugs and medication.” (Health 
Administrator 1). 
Source:  Primary Data 
Basically, interviews transcripts above show an appreciation of the core tenets of a health 
delivery system amongst leadership in health. This is reinforced by an in-depth appreciation of 
the evolutionary foundations of health financing models in the Zimbabwean health delivery 
system in line with the health systems thinking philosophy. The pre-RBF era was characterised 
by lack of confidence in the public health delivery system coupled with poor health outcomes. 
The government played a central role in the health delivery system through its populist mantra 
during the first decade upon attaining independence. The absence of a methodological 
monitoring and evaluation mechanism made it a challenge to ascertain the efficacy of the 
government’s role as the chief financier of health system in the country.  
46 
The main points distilled from the pre-RBF interviews transcripts above outline that, the 
Zimbabwean health delivery system went thorough a phased approach in the application of 
different health financing models. As the country was emerging from the colonial period, the 
first decade from independence was devoted to reinforcing the socialistic promises of the 
struggle to provide free-education and free-health for all. Hence, there was benevolence on the 
part of the Government as it was duty bound to provide social services inclusive of health care at 
highly subsidized rates following the dictates of the Standard Model. Though the Government 
went on an aggressive drive to build health centres across the country the major setback was a 
high doctor-patient ratio. There was a critical shortage of trained and qualified medical doctors; 
the country heavily relied on its bilateral relations with Cuba, which supplied expatriate doctors. 
Though medical institutions were available, accessibility to medical personnel and hence health 
service provision was poor. 
At the turn of the second decade post independent Zimbabwe, poor economic performance led 
the country to adopt more capitalistic approaches to health financing. The health financing 
paradigm shift was influenced by the Bretton Woods institutions, which advocated for cuts in 
social service expenditure. This culminated in the formulation of the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP). As such, the health financing approach advocated for the 
introduction of user fees (Bamako Initiative), a decrease in the central Government stronghold on 
health services provision (Decentralised Government Funding Model) and a clarion call for the 
donor community and the private sector to jointly invest in the health delivery system 
(Coordinated Basket Funding). 
The turn of the new millennium saw a drastic deterioration in economic variables in Zimbabwe, 
and for the decade that followed to 2010 all health delivery gains made over 2 decades from 
1980 were lost. The drought and near famine of the 2001-2002 saw a significant rise in infant 
mortality due to malnutrition, the inflation and exchange rate rise of the 2003-2004 saw the 
dispensaries at public health institutions becoming virtually empty as the government failed to 
capacitate them in line with the requirements of the Standard Model of health financing. The 
collapse of the economic fundamentals between the 2007-2008 periods was the last straw that 
broke the horses back where health delivery in Zimbabwe is concerned. Medical personnel 
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deserted their workstations as they either spent time on cash queues at banks or seeking for 
greener pastures in the diaspora. Inflationary pressures also meant that the public was not able to 
pay for medical attention. The politically hostile environment of 2008 election period was 
littered with regime change propaganda; hence the efforts of the donor community to assist in the 
health delivery process were frustrated. At the turn of 2010, it was inherent to rethink health-
financing models in the wake of the apparent failure of the aforementioned health financing 
models and the need to meet the global development agenda on health outcomes. 
The health systems thinking ideology of the post RBF period was characterised by the urge to 
strengthen the health delivery system, through supplementing health budgetary allocations with 
the view to improve health outcomes in respect of child and maternal health care. The RBF 
framework was launched and partially implemented in Zimbabwe in 2010 in 18 districts as 
illustrated in the previous chapter. The RBF test run saw some drastic improvements in health 
outcomes such as a decline in maternal and child mortality rates at primary health level (see 
Figure 4.1). The implementation of the RBF was able to expedite the availability, accessibility 
and utilisation of quality health services at health centre and district level (Sithole, 2013). 
Remote areas were targeted through innovative health delivery services such as mobile clinics 
and the recruitment of community health care workers and volunteers. Gains from RBF over the 
past six years that the programme has been operational in Zimbabwe reinforce the assertion that 
RBF is producing favourable results.  
The RBF came in to provide subsidies directly linked to services offered at primary health care 
level. Prior to the implementation of the RBF public health providers were not obliged to 
guarantee results for the funds that they received. Energy was devoted to securing funds and 
justifying inputs rather than improving the efficiency and quality of the health delivery systems 
(Sithole, 2013). This is where the RBF came in as a game changer in the financing of the health 
delivery system. RBF started with results, such as the number of children immunised, decreasing 
maternal mortality and infant mortality and giving health care providers the dispensation to 
determine how to achieve these results.  
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4.2.2 Performance of RBF against selected Economic framings 
4.2.2.1 Governance of Zimbabwe Health System 
The dimension on the governance of health systems is meant to focus attention on how primary 
health care institutions are being run in the wake of the RBF approach. In order to uncover the 
governance issues in the primary health care system a number of questions were posed to 
respondents and findings are categorised below. The governance of the Zimbabwean primary 
health care system encompasses health promotion, preventive, curative and rehabilitation 
activities. It has an intact referral system from the primary health care facilities to tertiary health 
facilities.  
Table 4.3: Presence of qualified personnel in Zimbabwe’s health system 
Post-RBF Detail Representative Quote 
Governance The inclusion of an 
implementing partner and 
the successful 
embracement of the 
Private Public 
Partnerships have acted 
as a good governance 
mechanism to introduce 
checks and balances. The 
adoption of PPP has 
improved service 
delivery as health 
personnel are found in all 
heath centres across the 
country. 
“The successful embracement of the Private 
Public Partnerships in the implementation of the 
RBF initiative in Zimbabwe has made it possible 
for qualified and adequate personnel to be located 
at each level in Zimbabwe’s health system.” 
(Policy Maker 3) 
All provinces and districts in Zimbabwe are 
adequately represented were minimum staff 
compliment is concerned. (Medical Officers 2) 
“The inclusion of an implementing partner acts as 
a good governance mechanism to introduce checks 
and balances to ensure that the health delivery 
system is operating well by ensuring that all health 
care centres are properly staffed.” (Medical 
Officer 1). 
Post- RBF Detail Representative Quote 
RBF incentives maintain 
a stable, competent and 
The role of incentives in RBF is to increase staff 
motivation hence improve the efficiency of 
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Equity and 
Inclusiveness 
motivated staff 
compliment.   
governance and delivery of primary health care. 
(Medical Officer 2) 
RBF incentives are managed at health centre level 
through the use of remuneration grading scales 
that are used to reward health care personnel 
according to their specific areas of responsibility. 
(Medical Officer 1).  
The community who are 
the recipients of health 
care need to have their 
voices heard for efficient 
health care service 
delivery.   
There has been a marked increase in community 
participation in the health sector. (Medical 
Officer 1) 
We derive our RBF results from the community; 
hence it is paramount that we consistently consult 
to get their cooperation and understanding of RBF 
goals. (Health Administrator 1) 
We conduct periodic community engagement 
through partnerships and social participation with 
the ultimate goal to involve the marginalised and 
excluded members of the community. (Medical 
Officer 2).  
Post-RBF Detail Representative Quote 
Sustainability What are the long-term 
effects of operating an 
incentive system? 
In the long run, RBF incentives are most likely to 
benefit and assist in retaining health care 
personnel in remote and rural areas. (Medical 
Officer Mashonaland 2) 
The issue of RBF incentives has to be tackled with 
caution since they are likely to create 
unsustainable expectations in perpetuity on the 
part of the recipients; who are currently catered 
for through the Salaries Services Bureau Payroll. 
(Health Administrator 2)  
In the event that RBF incentives are withdrawn 
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health care personnel might be disgruntled as they 
feel that it has become more of an entitlement. 
(Policy Maker 3).  
Source: Primary Data 
On the basis of governance of health delivery systems in Zimbabwe, the following themes were 
distilled from interviews. Respondents were of the opinion that there are qualified and adequate 
personnel at each level. The governance structures in the Zimbabwean health system cascades 
top down from the Minister of Health and Child Care to Medical Officers at each respective 
health centre. Proper checks and balances seem to be in place when it comes to the chain of 
command. Perhaps the major limitation of the RBF governance structure can be traced back to 
the formative stages of the RBF. A tedious process followed the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding to give effect to the operation of the RBF in Zimbabwe. Legal requirements were 
considered to be too cumbersome hence creating room for corruption, fraud and bribery. The 
same has been reported on the implementation of the RBF in Uganda as characterised by 
retrogressive policies that ultimately generated poor results (Davidson, 2009).  
Nevertheless, the RBF framework has reinforced the efficient performance of the Zimbabwean 
health system in terms of governance, as resource mobilisation is actioned at a local level. These 
findings are in contrast to findings by Sachs (2012) who established that most developing nations 
have been found to have weak governance systems for accountability of foreign aid since there 
are characterised with flagrant abuse and misappropriation of funds. 
4.2.2.2 Allocative Efficiency and Effectiveness after introduction of RBF. 
The direct impact of RBF implementation was realised through the enhanced stewardship of 
resources on the part of the recipients. Resources were allocated to areas that were capable of 
yielding the optimum return on investments in terms of health outcomes. The implementation of 
RBF as an extension of the Health Transition Fund in 2010 has managed to improve both 
allocative efficiency and effectiveness in primary health care.	  Government, with the support of 
cooperating partners made significant strides in health service delivery in line with the National 
Health Strategy (Zimbabwe National Budget Statement, 2012). Findings on the future prospects 
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of the Zimbabwean Primary Health delivery after the introduction of the RBF initiative is 
illustrated in Figure 4.1 below. 
Figure 4.1: Future Prospects of RBF 
Source: Adapted from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (2015) 
Figure 4.1 reveals that following the implementation of RBF in 2010; trends in primary health 
care outcomes have shown a marked improvement over the 5-year period under review. Under 
five infant mortality declined from a high of 82% in 2010 when RBF was initiated to a low of 
69% in 2015. Infant mortality declined from 57% to 50% during the same period. On the other 
hand, basic vaccination rose markedly from 64% in 2010 to 76% in 2015. It was highlighted that 
there has been a tremendous increase in access to obstetrics, newborn care and full immunisation 
coverage. For the 5-year period before 2010, basic vaccination coverage declined 5% from 2005-
2007, and increased by 15% from 2007 to 2010 prior to the RBF intervention. Similarly, infant 
and under 5 mortality showed improvements from 2008 and 2009 respectively which may partly 
be attributed to the increment in vaccination coverage. Prior to the implementation of RBF, 
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improving maternal and child health has always been a key objective of the MoHCW despite the 
existence of a poor performing public health care system characterised by low levels of physical 
access, lack of adequate incentives for health workers and weak monitoring and evaluation 
mechanisms. Of note, the 2008-2009 period marks the recovery of the Zimbabwean economy 
post the 2008 controversial elections, which led to the Government of National Unity. This 
resulted in significant support from the donor community in provision of human resources, 
essential medicines and medical supplies as ODA started to increase in 2008. A major health 
financing intervention was the Health Transition fund, which is believed to be sole cause for 
improvement in health indicators from 2009 (Salama et al., 2014). 
In the quest to achieve allocative efficiency and effectiveness community needs were being 
aligned as per RBF expectations. These findings reinforce the efficacy of the RBF programme as 
a health-financing model where key roles are delegated to local clinics and communities who are 
the key players in the program. This is different from other health financing models where the 
head office is the key planner and implementer of various health financing programmes. In a 
study of the key success factors in the implementation of the RBF in Rwanda, Basinga et al 
(2011) established that, “close cooperation with the donor community who provided the bulk of 
the funds to finance the health system, helped to reduce the mistrust and suspicion that is usually 
associated with centralised government and donors in the management of funds.” Through using 
this approach, decisions are made closer to the arena of action hence they are in a better position 
to respond to the needs of the community. Community based health care centres are empowered 
to design their own plans and procure medicines and equipment on their own.  
4.2.2.3 Accessibility of health institutions by target beneficiaries 
Table 4.4: Accessibility of health institutions by in terms of cost 
Finding Detail Representative Quote 
A monthly grant was 
offered to 1 500 
primary health 
centres and 94% of 
user fees were 
repealed in rural 
What has been the 
impact of the 
implementation of the 
RBF programme on 
health access costs? 
“The implementation of the RBF framework has 
managed to launch a monthly grant offered to 
almost 1 500 primary health centres in 
Zimbabwe.” (Medical Officer) 
“Through this grant 94% of user fees were 
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primary health care 
centres. Each district 
hospital manned by at 
least one qualified 
medical doctor who 
can perform a 
caesarean section. 
repealed in rural primary health care centres, 
user fees were also scraped for about 83% of 
urban families accessing primary health care 
particularly pregnant women and children below 
the age of five.”  (Donor 1)	  	  
“Each district hospital is manned by at least one 
junior medical doctor who can perform a 
caesarean section. This reduces transfer costs on 
the part of patients resorting to Provincial and 
National Hospitals” (Medical Officer 3) 
The main thrust of 
the RBF has been 
subsidised health care 
through scraping user 
fees to access 
primary health care.  
What has been the 
main thrust of the 
RBF programme in 
terms of health access 
costs? 
The RBF strengthened the health system through 
improving national capacity for health financing 
across all health service delivery levels.” 
(Medical Officer 1) 
Emphasis is on the peripheral primary health 
care. It was established that in all 18 districts in 
which the RBF has been successfully launched, 
there is full coverage at primary health care 
centres through subsidies that absolve the 
payment of user fees.” (Medical Officer 2) 
Source: Primary Data 
Despite the scraping of user fees at rural health centres, patients referred to higher-level health 
centres still have to pay user fees to access advanced health care. It appears that RBF has not 
been effective to offer full coverage to access higher-level health care, as RBF funds are 
insufficient to cover running costs.	  From an economic perspective, these user fees are meant to 
rationalise usage of health care services by households inasmuch as they primarily deter 
unnecessary service usage by householders (Quaye, 2007). Notwithstanding, the wavering of 
user fees accessibility is being hindered by dilapidated physical infrastructure and an ill prepared, 
ill-equipped health system devoid of basic drugs that fails to perform basic procedures at local 
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level. Lack of expertise is another issue militating against access to primary health care. Chronic 
brain drain led to shortages of midwifery and doctors and dampened the uptake of RBF. The 
presence of qualified staff was an essential precondition for the launch of the health-financing 
model. To counter this anomaly, junior doctors with minimal operating experience were 
deployed to lead district hospitals. 
4.2.2.4 Equity and Inclusiveness in Zimbabwe’s Health System after Introduction of RBF 
Equity is an essential dimension in the public health delivery process as it entails the availability 
and accessibility of health facilities by all members of the population. It was essential to review 
equity and inclusiveness within the context of the current study because one of the fundamental 
objectives of any health system is accessible health care to all. Data on equity and inclusiveness 
of the Zimbabwean health delivery system was collected through the use of the questionnaire and 
findings were corroborated with establishments from interviews. Findings are illustrated in 
Figure 4.2 below:  
Figure 4.2: Equity and Equity in RBF 
Source: Primary Data 
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Findings from the study predominantly established that most respondents disagreed that the 
Zimbabwean health delivery system was neither promoting equal opportunity for both men and 
women nor was it providing equitable distribution of health care provision in rural areas. Cross 
cultural and religious beliefs had an effect on the equity of health care services under RBF. Some 
religions do not allow their followers to access health care from formal health institutions rather 
they emphasize on spiritual healing. Such spiritual churches are predominantly located in poor 
and remote areas where they command a larger following. Though health care centres are open 
to all cross-cultural groups, the failure to tap into the influential religious circle affects equal 
access and inclusivity of health care services amongst all groups. Qualitative findings on Equity 
and Inclusiveness in Zimbabwe’s Health System are shown in table 4.7 below.  
Table 4.5: Equity and Inclusiveness in Zimbabwe’s Health System 
Finding Detail Representative Quote 
Trained medical staff 
is shunning remote 
health centres	  due to	  
low and poor 
remuneration 
packages and the 
reluctance by the 
treasury to lift the 
recruitment freeze on 
health personnel. 
What are your 
views on the 
equity and 
inclusiveness 
of health care 
access between 
rural areas and 
urban areas 
after the 
implementation 
of the RBF 
Programme? 
“In terms of the inclusiveness of the RBF, other 
countries, governments have assumed leadership of the 
program and have increased budget support for the 
health sector to scale up equity and inclusiveness of 
RBF.” (Health administrator 1) 
“The mass exodus of trained and qualified health 
personnel to greener pastures and the reluctance of the 
government to lift the recruitment freeze on health 
personnel lead to inequity in health delivery between 
rural and urban health centres, as the remaining 
trained medical staff shunned remote health centres.” 
(Health administrator 2). 
“Health personnel who are fortunate to be employed in 
public sector health care centres are faced with low 
and poor remuneration packages. Those on remote 
areas bear the brunt of sub-standard accommodation 
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facilities and inadequately equipped medical 
facilities.” (Medical Officer 1). 
“Equitable access to primary health is not only 
attributed to the failure of health care providers alone, 
but also to the receivers themselves. In some 
communities’ people prefer to resort to alternative 
health care systems such as spiritual healing and 
traditional healing methods.” (Medical Officer 2). 
Source:  Primary Data 
In light of the above findings, it can be asserted that due to dwindling government expenditure 
and budgetary allocations to the health care sector, health personnel are discouraged from 
operating in remote areas, hence minimising access to optimal health to the rural population. The 
mass exodus of trained and qualified health personnel to greener pastures and the reluctance of 
the government to lift the recruitment freeze on health personnel lead to inequity in health 
delivery between rural and urban health centres, as the remaining trained medical staff shunned 
remote health centres in preference for the private sector. In addition to this, there are some 
remote inaccessible rural areas where patients have to walk long distances to access health 
services. Though there are mobile clinics the visits are far and wide apart leading to patients 
abandoning some visits to health care centres leading to continued home deliveries, thereby 
reducing the effectiveness of maternal and infant mortality as well as immunisation programmes. 
These findings are in contravention of the WHO (2000) policy framework that advocated for 
unrestricted distribution of health facilities and health care access by the indigent members of the 
community.  
Despite these transitory setbacks, since the implementation of the RBF programme there has 
been considerable progress towards universal health access through decentralisation of decision-
making and exemption of the indigent from payment. These moves appear to uphold the key 
tenets as enunciated by the Bamako Initiative. Notwithstanding, this the non-availability of 
doctors and the high distance to health facilities remain a major deterrent to reaping full benefits 
of the RBF program. 
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4.2.2.5 Future Prospects of Results Based Finance  
Future prospects of the RBF initiative are based on ways to scale-up the RBF programme for 
continuity and future relevance. Declining mortality rates and increases in basic vaccination 
coverage are seen as precursors of a sound primary health delivery system. 
Table 4.6: Future prospects of RBF Programme 
Finding Detail Representative Quote 
RBF capital 
investments have the 
ability to enhance the 
sustainability of 
existing health care 
facilities. 
What are your views 
on the prospects of 
the RBF? 
“In the wake of recurrent national and foreign 
debts that the economy is servicing, the inclusion 
of the RBF model of health financing has long 
term impact on the sustainability of the primary 
health delivery system.” (Health Administrator 
1) 
How can the 
sustainability of the 
RBF programme be 
reinforced?  
“Higher level negotiations are underway to 
ensure that health care service providers have 
their salary increments linked to performance as 
measured by the RBF framework”. (Health 
Administrator 2) 
“Donor organisations supporting the RBF 
programme assume the responsibility of 
financing the salary increments for health care 
providers whilst the central government takes 
care of the basic salaries.” (Policy Maker 1) 
“Instead of pre-occupying the RBF program as 
a revenue expenditure based initiative, 
sustainability of RBF programs can be 
guaranteed if great strides can be achieved when 
RBF funds are employed into capital projects.” 
(Policy Maker 2) 
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 Source: Primary Data 
Deliberations from interviews also outlined that RBF capital investments have the ability to 
enhance the functionality of existing health care facilities and go a long way in making existing 
facilities better. In all health care centres under review, great strides have been made towards 
ensuring the future continuity of the RBF program. Apart from utilising RBF funds to capacitate 
the operational capacity of health care centres through offering incentives to health care 
personnel and ensuring that basic drugs are available, RBF has gone a step further to strategically 
position health care centres for future roles through capital consumption programs under the 
auspices of infrastructural development, care and maintenance. Such initiatives have seen health 
care centres under the RBF program acquiring new and improved equipment and facilities that 
expand the breadth of services that they offer.  
Nevertheless, issues of community involvement in health-related issues as enunciated by the 
health systems thinking philosophy have resulted in informed choice amongst the community on 
health matters that concern them. In line with the community participation philosophy, this study 
established that community participation in health matters is a long-term health system 
strengthening intervention strategy that helps to maximise health well-being for the nation, 
ensure health equity and strengthen health outcomes. This assertion is reinforced by the increase 
in health coverage by twelve percentage points over the five-year period. In essence accessibility 
of vaccination increased from around two-thirds to three-quarters of the child population, is a 
milestone even if the remaining 25% is yet to be covered adequately.  
4.3 Relevance of Economic Framings on Collected Data on RBF 
Performance indicators for RBF were classified in four categories namely, governance, financial 
sustainability, allocative efficiency and effectiveness and equity and inclusiveness. Following the 
implementation of RBF in 2010, there have been some notable developments in the Zimbabwean 
primary health delivery system. For instance, some maternity homes were constructed in 
Matabeleland North Province in Binga District to enhance equity and inclusiveness since Binga 
is one of the most remote and poorest of Zimbabwean rural community. In addition to this, 
waiting mother’s shelters, pit latrines, sheds at meeting points were also erected. These measures 
compliment the provision of essential medical consumables and inputs. These measures were put 
in place to empower local health centres to achieve pre-determined results (Governance) so that 
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they would be able to, provide quality health care services over the long run (Sustainability), 
provide of health services that match community needs through community participation in 
decision making (Allocative efficiency), in a manner that makes health services available to all 
members of the community (equity and inclusiveness). Current research findings on the 
relevance of a set performance indicators on collecting data on RBF is illustrated in Table 4.7 
below.  
Table 4.7: Relevance of a set performance indicators on collecting data on RBF 
Finding Detail Representative Quote 
The proportion of 
budgetary 
expenditure on health 
care is an essential 
performance 
indicator RBF 
Relevance of a set 
performance 
indicators on 
collecting data on 
RBF 
Government health expenditure as a percentage 
of GDP, the percentage of health expenditure 
financed by donors, total per-capita expenditure 
on health and sources of financing for health 
and their relative shares of total expenditure are 
essential set performance indicators for 
financial sustainability of an RBF health 
financing system. (Donor 1) 
The percentage of government health budget 
expenditure allocated directed to primary health 
care and personnel expenditure, as a percentage 
of total recurrent health expenditure is a 
valuable set performance indicator for allocative 
efficiency and effectiveness of an RBF health 
financing system. (Donor 2) 
The financial sustainability of an RBF health 
financing model in the wake of donor fatigue and 
receding government expenditure on the health 
care sector rested on the implementation of joint 
Private Public Partnerships that are premised 
on coordinating the core competencies of 
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various players in delivering the best primary 
health care. (Medical Officer 3) 
Source:  Primary Data 
The main themes distilled from the above interview responses point out that there is a general 
consensus amongst the respondents that the RBF model has managed to strengthen the 
Zimbabwean health system through the provision of financial resources that enable health care 
institutions to procure essential medicines. Owing to budgetary constraints the government had 
to rope in an implementing partner to complement investments in the primary health care 
delivery system. Zimbabwe is a signatory to the Abuja Declaration of 2000 on Health, which 
requires that the Health Budget must be 15% of total expenditure. Nevertheless, with respect to 
health, budgetary performance fell below the threshold of 15% due to scarcity of funds 
(Zimbabwe National Budgetary Statement, 2012). This had the effect of compromising the speed 
at which Zimbabwe could attain the MDG 4 and 5 targets.  
4.4 Motivation for Implementing the RBF policy framework 
The ultimate goal of adopting the RBF program was to recover and strengthen the health 
delivery system that had crumbled amid a debilitating economic and political environment 
characterised by a malfunctioning health system in terms of drugs, equipment and labour 
shortage. Findings from the study are illustrated in Table 4.9 below. 
Table 4.8: Motivation for Implementing the RBF policy framework 
Finding Detail Representative Quote 
What prompted RBF 
implementation and 
how the intervention 
was designed within 
the context of 
Zimbabwe? 
A well-documented 
RBF policy 
framework acts as a 
reference point 
inasmuch as it is a 
legacy document. 
The need to strengthen the health delivery 
system created an impetus for the 
implementation of RBF. The government has 
however been implementing RBM in various 
sectors including health. (Donor 1) 
Owing to budgetary constraints the government 
had to rope in an implementing partner to safe 
guard the primary health care system (Medical 
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Officer 2) 
Which unintended or 
perverse effects did 
RBF generate in the 
Zimbabwe’s health 
sector? 
“There have been issues pertaining to 
transparency and perceptions by the community 
that health care workers are receiving huge 
sums of money at the expense of community 
development and there have been divisions 
among health care workers between those who 
were receiving incentives and those who are not. 
(Medical Officer 1) 
“A bad culture of expectation may be difficult to 
correct once incentives are withdrawn” 
(Medical Officer 2) 
What challenges did 
you encounter in 
implementing the 
RBF framework? 
“There is a lack of consistency in the frequency 
of internal monitoring mechanisms	  since	  people 
assigned to do internal monitoring are inundated 
with other duties.” (Health Administrator 1) 
“RBF designers did not take into account the 
unique socio-political context under which the 
programme was being implemented in 
Zimbabwe.” (Medical Officer 2) 
“There are restrictions imposed by the 
implementing partners and government. RBF 
programme is not flexible enough to actively 
respond to realities on the ground. (Health 
Administrator 2) 
Source:  Primary Data  
Key points distilled from the study stress that for the five-year period that RBF has been 
implemented in Zimbabwe there has been significant progress in documenting the achievements 
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made by the health-financing model. It can be noted that internal monitoring mechanisms within 
the primary public health institutions is inherently weak. There is a	   lack of consistency in the 
frequency of internal monitoring mechanisms due to the employment freeze as people assigned 
to do internal monitoring are inundated with other duties. It appears that RBF designers did not 
take into account the unique socio-political context under which the programme was being 
implemented in Zimbabwe based on the primary data collected from interviews. The emphasis 
on the achievement of set targets brought about a level of rigidity in the roll out of the RBF 
programme in a manner that made it inflexible to contextual realities.  
In essence, in the pre-RBF health provider institutions were not obliged to guarantee that health 
services would be provided and this position was challenged with the adoption of RBF. Though 
significant progress has been noted in improving health outcomes as depicted by the decline in 
mortality rates; these are still high and do not come close to MGDs targets by 2015. Challenges 
in remarkably decreasing mortality rates can be attributed to the existence of legal frameworks 
and red tape in the roll out of RBF programmes, deteriorating infrastructure, lack of expertise in 
the health sector, inaccessibility of some remote health centres and religious and cultural beliefs 
that militate against the implementation of the RBF.  
4.5 Trends in place of delivery and childhood vaccinations 
The essence of RBF is shown by its ability to deliver positive health outcomes. Two main health 
outcomes selected for the purposes of this analysis include health facilities deliveries and basic 
vaccination coverage, which are precursors of sound infant and child health, the core tenet of the 
RBF framework. Findings are illustrated in Figure 4.1 below.  
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Figure 4.3: Trends in place of delivery and childhood vaccinations 
Source: Adapted from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (2015) and (2010-
11) 
From the Figure 4.3 shows that there was a 12% increase in deliveries at health facilities between 
2010 and 2015 in contrast with the 4% decline between 2005-06 and 2010. This can be partly 
attributed to RBF implementation in selected districts across the country. However, childhood 
vaccinations have shown an upward trend since 2005 and incremental contribution of the RBF 
program may be difficult to ascertain nationally. The Zimbabwean government has efforts under 
the auspices of the MoHCW to train Village Health Workers to mobilise and educate the public 
especially pregnant women and nursing mothers on safe pregnancy and child health care with the 
hope of improving Health facility deliveries and childhood vaccinations. Following these efforts, 
an increasing number of women now give birth under medical supervision even though there are 
pockets of resistance from some religious groups. In order to spread the RBF philosophy to the 
grassroots, communities have been urged to form community-based organisations whose primary 
role is to mobilise and educate the public on health-related issues. The MoHCW has played an 
active role in mobilising funds for training and holding workshops from CORDAID the chief 
implementing partner in the RBF Initiative and other NGO’s such as UNICEF. To strengthen the 
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referral system, US$3million was allocated to the health sector for the procurement of 
ambulances and service vehicles (Zimbabwe National Budgetary Statement, 2012). The 
achievements generated by a strong referral system resulted in an improved Zimbabwe’s ranking 
out of which it is in the top 10 in Africa with regards to reduction in child mortality. Zimbabwe 
has the largest reduction in child mortality in Africa for the period 2000 to 2011 (Zimbabwe 
National Budgetary Statement, 2014).  
4.5.1 Trends in Primary Health care Outcomes 
In order to outline the essence of the Results Based Finance as the preferred primary health-
financing model it is imperative to re-look at the performance of the primary health sector prior 
to embracing the RBF framework. In order to achieve this, a comparison is made between 
Zimbabwe and rest of Sub-Saharan Africa in the attainment of Immunisation Coverage for 
Diphtheria Pertussis Tetanus (DPT). DPT has significant implications for infant health in 
primary health care. Findings are illustrated in Table 4.2 below.  
Table 4.9: Comparative Pre-RBF Trends in the Immunisation Coverage for DPT 
Time Period 1986 1994 1999 
Immunisation Coverage  
For  
Diphtheria Pertussis Tetanus 
Zimbabwe 75% 80% 81% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 32% 51% 48% 
Source: Adapted from the Sithole (2013) 
Findings illustrated in Table 4.2 show that comparatively, Zimbabwe had higher coverage for the 
Immunisation of DPT as opposed to the average for the rest of the Sub-Saharan Africa. This can 
be attributed to the significant investments by the Zimbabwean Government which were seen as 
a panacea to a two-tier health system imposed by the colonial regime that discriminated between 
the rich and poor, blacks and whites, rural and urban dwellers. Upon gaining independence, the 
Zimbabwean increased its health expenditure by 80% of the pre-independence levels and ensured 
that the rate of child immunisation almost tripled between 1980 and 1988. However, the 
economic decline from the year 2000 led to a drastic decline in health outcomes owing to 
reduced spending on health. Resultantly there was a marked decline in health coverage by almost 
40%, an increase in chronic malnutrition. The imposition of user fees compounded child 
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mortality rate as 1 in every 11 children died before their fifth birthday (MoHCW, 2012). Table 
4.3 below illustrates the situation obtaining after the adoption of RBF in 2010. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter gave a critical analysis of health systems thinking with regards to health care 
financing models within the Zimbabwean health sector. This research established a number of 
revelations with regards to the influence that health systems thinking has towards the 
achievement of health outcomes. In order to properly unlock health systems thinking, it was 
considered essential to focus on both the pre-RBF and post-RBF periods. 
The pre-RBF era was characterised by poor health outcomes and a lack of confidence in the 
public health delivery system. The pre-RBF period in independent Zimbabwe can be traced back 
to 1980 when the country gained its independence. During the first decade, the government 
adopted a social-populist free-health-for-all approach. The government was the dominant 
financier of health and the predominant thinking was that the social services could best be 
provided through the provision of subsidies and centralisation of the loci of control. 
Nevertheless, the absence of a methodological monitoring and evaluation mechanism made it a 
challenge to ascertain the efficacy of the government’s role as the chief financier of health 
system in the country.  
The government’s benevolence towards the provision of highly subsidised social services was 
compromised by the launch of the economic blue print under the auspices of the Economic 
Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the early 1990’s. This marked the tipping point on 
the government’s dominant role in social services as the dictates of ESAP entailed a drastic cut 
in government expenditure on social services. Hence, the enactment of demand-side 
interventions through the imposition user fees marked a paradigm shift in health systems 
thinking were health-financing models are concerned. The cut in government expenditure was 
characterised by the removal of subsidies on social services and accompanying massive 
retrenchments in the public-sector measures that were believed to improve efficiency in the 
delivery of social services.	   However, this move resulted in a lack of confidence in the public 
health delivery system as people shunned the public health delivery system in preference to 
alternative sources of healing such as “faith healing” and “traditional healing”. Owing to limited 
fiscal space brought about by ESAP reforms coupled with heath budgetary allocations that had 
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inherent disbursement challenges, there was a resultant drastic deterioration in some key health 
performance indicators such as the child and infant mortality rate as the Government failed to 
adequately fund primary health care. Basically, pre-RBF thinking was characterised by 
government stronghold in the provision of social services. 
Post-RBF thinking	   was motivated by the need to strengthen the health delivery system and 
supplement health budgetary allocations with the view to improve health outcomes. There was 
an urgent realisation and need to resuscitate the appalling health delivery system through a 
participatory approach that does not strain the fiscal space. The partial implementation of RBF in 
2010 especially in remote areas filled the void created by a receding government expenditure on 
social services. There was the strengthening the health delivery system through the provision of 
supplementary health budgetary allocations from implementing partners with the view to 
improve health outcomes particularly in respect of child and maternal health care. Private 
partners took an active role in the distribution of health finance outside government in order to 
improve transparency. The World Bank initiated RBF thinking in order to respond to specific 
needs in high priority areas of maternal health and child health care. Basically, the post- RBF 
thinking was characterised by government letting go ofa its stronghold in the provision of social 
services and inviting independent partners to play an active role in the provision and financing of 
social services. In light of this, through an active community involvement and participation in 
health matters there has been a growing confidence in the public sector in the provision of 
primary health care services since public health centres are the major beneficiaries of RBF 
funding.  
This study established that community participation in health matter is a long-term health system 
strengthening intervention strategy that helps to maximise health well-being for the nation, 
ensure health equity and strengthen health outcomes. As a result of the adoption of a holistic 
approach to health systems thinking, trends in the use of modern methods of contraception as 
typical primary health outcomes showed a marked improvement in usage between the years 2010 
to 2015. Moreover, the inclusion of an implementing partner and the successful embracement of 
the Private Public Partnerships have acted as a good governance mechanism to introduce checks 
and balances in RBF implementation and control. RBF incentives were found to be essential for 
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the retention and motivation of health personnel. However, word of caution was that they might 
create a perception of entitlement if they are continued in the long run. The succeeding chapter 
focuses on summarising the entire research through providing conclusions and offering 
recommendations. 
Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.0 Summary 
The purpose of this research was to lay groundwork for an in-depth study of the application of 
RBF as the emerging preferred primary health-financing model in developing countries. The 
research focused on the health services sector as it was used as the launch pad for the 
implementation of the RBF initiative in Zimbabwe. The main objective of the study was to 
evaluate how RBF has performed to ascertain whether it can be the effective financing model in 
a resource constrained Zimbabwe post the MDGs period. In the quest to satisfy this objective, 
the study examined how health systems thinking influences the achievement of health outcomes 
and identified preconditions that enable the effectiveness of aid management tools within the 
economic framings of governance, sustainability, equity, effectiveness and allocative efficiency. 
In terms of governance findings established that in the post- RBF era there has been a marked 
improvement in the number of child deliveries in rural health care centres across the country, as 
well as a noticeable decline in under 5 and infant mortality attributable to improved governance 
of RBF funds. These findings are in contrast to findings by Sachs (2012) who established that 
most developing nations have been found to have weak governance systems for accountability of 
foreign aid since there are characterised with flagrant abuse and misappropriation of funds. 
Current findings also support the argument of Quaye (2007) under the dictates of the Standard 
Model that the introduction of incentive methods ensures efficient delivery of health services by 
health care providers. There is clear motivation of primary health care staff, which has 
significantly improved service delivery. 
Allocative efficiency and effectiveness findings established that there has been a positive impact 
in post-natal care visits in rural health care centres that are sponsored by the RBF program as 
opposed to the pre-RBF period. Most importantly, there has been the liberalisation of the health 
care system to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency through community based decision-
making and empowerment approaches. The study is consistent with debates on the need to 
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identify of patterns of health spending to achieve allocative efficiency in the health sector (Care, 
2015) and embracing community participation in funding and decision-making to increase 
allocative efficiency (Olmen et al., 2012).  
RBF implementation is poised for the future to reap sustained gains due to community buy in 
and appreciation of the public health system. Sustainability findings are mainly hinged on 
Zimbabwe assuming Savedoff (2011) responsibility for the RBF programmes and its outcomes 
on a national level without overly depending on donor funding.	  The sustainability of funding is 
at risk because considering the limited fiscal allocation to the health sector; the government on 
its own will not be able to finance the RBF programme without donor aid. This exacerbates 
Zimbabwe’s foreign aid dependency syndrome that affects the sustainability of the health 
system. Results Based Financing programme scraps user fees for primary health care to improve 
accessibility to health care services but however the efficacy of scrapping user fees is attenuated 
by poor and dilapidated infrastructure and shortage of drugs. This compromises RBF returns as 
evidenced in the implementation of the RBF in Afghanistan and Haiti (Hansen et al, 2008).  
In terms of equity and inclusiveness, the current study revealed that there is a trade-off between 
achieving allocative efficiency and equity, especially when scaling up health programmes under 
the RBF programme. Findings are consistent with revelations that donors acting alone or at 
ideological odds with one another can undermine the reform process in aid management and 
coordination and ultimately equity and inclusiveness (Buse and Walt, 1996). The current study 
also established that RBF expends more resources to reach marginalised populations with 
primary health care in order to guarantee equity and inclusiveness. This is consistent with 
protecting society’s most vulnerable through exempting them from paying (Wang’ombe et al., 
2002), universal coverage in access to health care (Bonfrer, 2015), budget constraints impacting 
negatively on achieving equity in health care delivery (The World Bank, 2005). 
5.1 Conclusions 
The study established that there is a trade-off between achieving allocative efficiency and equity, 
especially when scaling up health programmes under the RBF initiative. Issues of access to 
health funds has been a topical issue in health financing, the works of Akortsu (2013) highlight 
that irregular flow of funds and gradual delays in the disbursement of RBF funds results in poor 
execution of the RBF initiative. In the Zimbabwean context, the government has been struggling 
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to disburse funds to the health sector amongst other sectors in the economy even if the funds 
were properly budgeted for. The increasing failure to pay health employees’ salaries and 
administrative expenses in time gives, credence to claims that RBF works best in resource 
moderate and rich environments, especially so when there is autonomy in the disbursement of 
health funds.  
The imposition of user fees with the hope of ensuring the sustainability of higher-level health 
systems has often been beset with inherent weaknesses that are related to the socio-economic 
context under which user fees are being implemented. Weaknesses may be in the form of poor 
revenue collection structures, which is compounded by the inability of patients to pay user fees 
and charges. In some cases, services are offered on credit though there are high default rates. In 
addition, delays in settling payments on the part of the treasury for services rendered to those 
patients who are qualified for exemption affects the viability of health services. Revelations from 
the current study highlight that the sustainability of the RBF initiative is largely attributed to 
continued donor engagement, as the government cannot solely financially sustain the magnitude 
of the program. 
The pre-RBF era was characterised by poor primary health outcomes, unsound governance and a 
lack of confidence in the public health delivery system. The government’s dominant role as the 
chief financier of health services, the predominant socialistic ideology thinking and loci of 
control of health care finance threatened the viability and sustainability of health care funding 
initiatives. The initiation of RBF ushered in a new dispensation in health care financing in 
Zimbabwe characterised by health systems strengthening through providing supplementary 
health sector budgetary support with the view to influence and unlock positive health outcomes. 
Though significant progress has been registered in the post-RBF period with regards to access to 
health care to marginalised groups, the same cannot be said in terms of improvements in health 
care outcomes such as mortality rates. This phenomenon can be attributed to notable challenges 
that include a lack of expertise in the health sector, religious and cultural beliefs, deteriorating 
infrastructure, poor remuneration, legal frameworks and red tape as well as corruption hampering 
the implementation of the RBF.  
Nevertheless, there has been some commendable advancement on improving health outcomes 
where allocative efficiency and effectiveness of the primary health delivery system is concerned 
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as shown by slight increases in post-natal care visits in rural health care centres that are 
sponsored by the RBF programme as opposed to the pre-RBF period. This can be attributed to 
the liberalisation of the health care systems to achieve higher levels of allocative efficiency 
through community based decision making and empowerment approaches to help communities 
to design their own plans and procure medicines and equipment on their own. Moreover, under 
the auspices of the RBF, private partners assumed an active role in health finance outside 
government with a view to improve transparency,	   governance, sustainability, equity, 
effectiveness and allocative efficiency in health care financings. 
5.2 Recommendations and Future Research Direction 
In terms of Governance of Health Systems, it is urged that the government upholds the spirit of 
partnership under the Private Public Partnerships (PPP) initiative, especially with key partners 
such as CORDAID. Such PPP arrangements in the implementation of RBF has ensured donor 
coordination, mutual accountability, harmonisation of efforts to ensure positive health outcomes 
and ownership of the initiative due to active involvement of communities and the state. 
Following favourable results in the pilot districts, the RBF programme was rolled out across all 
provinces and districts in Zimbabwe. PPPs ease the allocation of resources, enhance equity in 
health care provision and are a good governance mechanism to ensure that the health delivery 
system is operating well in line with the dictates of the RBF philosophy. 
The paradox between the other two granular measures of the RBF programme, efficiency and 
equity can also be resolved through operating under a PPP initiative. A study by Steketee and 
Eisele (2009) corroborated the above assertion by suggesting that countries with higher levels of 
health care coverage do not necessarily achieve higher levels of equity. For sustained efficiency, 
a more sustainable approach must be put in place as incentives only work as a short-term 
measure and they create a perpetual expectation or entitlement, which leads to disgruntlement 
when withdrawn on the part of the recipients.  
A quarter of respondents highlighted that health care is not easily accessible, which affects that 
viability of RBF programmes. Building more rural health centres in proximity to communities 
can enhance accessibility of health care services by the underprivileged and most vulnerable. 
RBF scale-up initiatives must address the issue of health staff shortages to improve the allocative 
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efficiency of expended resources. However, this is only possible within an accountability 
framework that curbs corrupt activities.  
As a way of sustaining the RBF programme it is prudent to link and align the RBF programme to 
the central government budgetary system and allocate more resources to the health sector to 
complement aid resources. Based on previous budgetary allocations across sectors in Zimbabwe, 
it appears that issues of national sovereignty take precedence over the sustainability of 
development initiatives like RBF. The World Bank (2013) reports that Burundi managed to 
integrate its RBF health financing needs with the national budget with the national fiscal space 
contributing up to 52 % of the financing costs of the RBF program, which is a strong pre-
determinant of sustainability, commitment, and assumption of ownership of RBF. It is therefore 
apparent that integrating RBF with the national fiscal space goes a long way in ensuring positive 
development outcomes. 
In the spirit of achieving higher levels of inclusiveness in the Zimbabwean Primary Health care 
sector; it is advised to nurture community engagement as promulgated through partnerships and 
social participation. These initiatives will go a long way in enabling accessibility of health 
centres, and the involvement of marginalised and excluded people.  
The current study focused on the efficacy of the Results Based Financing model as an aid 
management tool in the health sector in a typical developing country context characterised with 
resource constraints. Future research directions might conduct a similar study in other public 
service sectors that received RBF, for instance the Primary and Secondary Education Sector that 
received under the UNICEF education financing programme to make a better-informed 
judgement on how best RBF can effectively and efficiently contribute to better aid management, 
ensure equity and improve governance of service delivery in the context of Zimbabwe and other 
developing economies. Alternatively, RBF can be compared with other health financing 
frameworks to ascertain which model is better suited to the unique context of Zimbabwe and can 
better achieve results towards the 2030 development agenda. Moreover, under the principle of 
additionality, it would be ideal to have an impact assessment of RBF across sectors to attribute 
its contribution to society and public sector reform, using a set of common evaluation metrics to 
determine where its most applicable and whether it can be the solution that cuts across sectors. 
72 
References 
Acosta, P. (2011) Challenges in Financing Education , Health , and Social Protection 
Expenditures in Zimbabwe. 
Akortsu, M. A. (2013) ‘Financing public healthcare institutions in Ghana’. doi: 
10.1108/14777261111134383. 
Ali, E. E. (2014) ‘Health care financing in Ethiopia: Implications on access to essential 
medicines’, Value in Health Regional Issues. Elsevier, 4(1), pp. 37–40. doi: 
10.1016/j.vhri.2014.06.005. 
Álvarez, M. M. and Acharya, A. (2012) Working Paper No . 2012 / 69 Aid Effectiveness in the 
Health Sector Melisa Martínez Álvarez and Arnab Acharya *. 
Anderson, G. and Arsenalt, N. (2001) Fundamentals of educational research. 2nd editio. 
Routledge Falmer. 
Arah, O. . et al. (2003) ‘Conceptual Frameworks for Health Systems Performance: A Quest for 
Effectiveness, Quality and Improvement’, International Journal for Quality Helath Care, 15(5), 
pp. 377–398. Available at: http://intqhc.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/5/377. 
As, P. A. Y. et al. (2013) ‘Zimbabwe Revenue Authority’, (December), p. 2013. 
Awosusi, A., Folaranmi, T. and Yates, R. (2015) ‘Nigeria’s new government and public 
financing for universal health coverage’, The Lancet Global Health. Awosusi. Open Access 
article distributed under the terms of CC BY, 3(9), pp. e514–e515. doi: 10.1016/S2214-
109X(15)00088-1. 
Bonfrer, I. (2015) ‘Evaluating Health Care Financing Reforms in Africa’, Journal of Economics 
and Business. Elsevier Ltd, 4(2), pp. 2–3. doi: 10.1002/hrdq.1218/abstract. 
Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2006) ‘Using thematic analysis in psychology’, Qualitative Research 
in Psychology, 3(May 2015), pp. 77–101. doi: 10.1191/1478088706qp063oa. 
Burke, R. and Sridhar, D. (2013) ‘Health Financing in Ghana , South Africa and Nigeria  : Are 
They Meeting the Abuja Target?’, in. 
73 
Buse, K. and Walt, G. (1996) ‘Aid Coordination for Health Sector Reform: A Conceptual 
Framework for Analysis and Assessment’, Health Policy, 38(3), pp. 173–187. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0168-8510(96)00855-X. 
Care, Q. H. (2015) ‘Health Sector Strategic Plan’, 2020(July). 
Dimovska, D. et al. (2009) Innovative Pro-poor Health care financing and delivery models. 
Easterly, W. (2008a) Can the West save Africa? NBER Worki. Cambridge: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Available at: http://www.nber.org/papers/w14363. 
Easterly, W. (2008b) No Title. Cambridge. 
Ebrahim, G. J. (1993) ‘The bamako initiative’, Journal of Tropical Pediatrics, 39(2), pp. 66–67. 
doi: 10.1093/tropej/39.2.66. 
Emek, U. (2015) ‘Turkish experience with public private partnerships in infrastructure: 
Opportunities and challenges’, Utilities Policy, 37, pp. 120–129. doi: 10.1016/j.jup.2015.06.005. 
Engelbert, P. and Tull, D. M. (2008) ‘Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about 
Failed States’, International Security, 32(34), pp. 106–139. 
Ensor, T. et al. (2017) ‘Impact of health financing policies in Cambodia: A 20 year experience’, 
Social Science & Medicine. Elsevier Ltd, 177, pp. 118–126. doi: 
10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.01.034. 
Fretheim, A. et al. (2014) Performance-based financing in low- and middle-income countries: 
still more questions than answers, WHO Bulletin. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/90/8/12-106468/en/. 
Grittner, A. M. (2013) Results-based financing; Evidence from performance-based financing in 
the health sector. Dicussion. German Development Institute. 
Health, M. S. for (2012) ‘Community-based participation and initiatives’, in. 
Hjertholm, P., White, H. and White, H. (1998) Survey of foreign aid  : History , trends and 
allocation. Discussion. Available at: https://ideas.repec.org/p/kud/kuiedp/0004.html. 
74 
Johannessen, Å. et al. (2014) ‘Strategies for building resilience to hazards in water, sanitation 
and hygiene (WASH) systems: The role of public private partnerships’, International Journal of 
Disaster Risk Reduction. Elsevier, 10(PA), pp. 102–115. doi: 10.1016/j.ijdrr.2014.07.002. 
Kanbur, R. (2003) The economics of international aid. 
Kaufmann, D. (2008) Aid Effectiveness and Governance The Good , the Bad and the Ugly. 
World Bank institute. Available at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/Resources/kaufmann-corrected.pdf. 
Kirigia, J. et al. (2006) ‘An Overview of Health Financing Patterns and the Forward in the WHO 
African Region’, East African Media Journal, 83(9) Supl, pp. s1-28. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/eamj.v83i9.9492. 
Llavador, H. G. and Roemer, J. E. (2001) ‘An equal-opportunity approach to the allocation of 
international aid’, 64. 
Lozano, R. et al. (2011) ‘Progress Towards Millenium Goals 4 & 5 on Maternal and Child 
Mortality. An Updated Systematic Analysis’, The Lancet, 378(9797), pp. 1139–1165. 
Mcintyre, D. (2012) Health service financing for universal coverage in east and southern Africa. 
Medhekar, A. (2014) ‘Public-Private Partnerships for Inclusive Development: Role of Private 
Corporate Sector in Provision of Healthcare Services’, Procedia - Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, 157, pp. 33–44. doi: 10.1016/j.sbspro.2014.11.007. 
Meesen B, Soucat A, S. (2011) Performance based financing: Just a door fad or a catalyst 
towards comprehensive health care reforms? 
Meessen, B. and Sekabaraga, C. (2011) ‘Policy & practice Performance-based financing  : just a 
donor fad or a catalyst towards comprehensive health-care reform  ?’, (March 2010), pp. 153–
156. doi: 10.2471/BLT.10.077339.
Mehdi, S. (1999) Health and family planning indicators  : Measuring sustainability volume II. 
Mitchell, A. (2010) Results based aid, Carnegie Endowment Speech. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dfid.gov.uk/news/speeches-and-
articles/2010/placing-women-at-the-heart-of-development/. 
75 
Moyo, D. (2010) Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa. 
First Amer. Farrar, Straus, Giroux. 
Murray, C. J. L. and Frenk, J. (2000) A framework for assessing the performance of health 
systems. Available at: http://www.who.int/bulletin/archives/78(6)717.pdf. 
Musango, L. et al. (2013) State of health financing in the african region. 
Musgrove, P. (2011) Financial and other rewards for good performance or results  : A guided 
tour of concepts and terms and a short glossary. Available at: 
https://www.rbfhealth.org/sites/rbf/files/RBFglossarylongrevised_0.pdf. 
Nibbering, J. W. and Swart, R. (2008) Giving local government a more central place in 
development: An examination of donor support for decentralisation, OECD/DAC. 
O’Brien, T. and Kabur, R. (2013) The Operational Dimensions of Results Based Financing. 
OECD (2010) Glossary of key terms in evaluation and results based management. 
OECD (2012) ‘Aid effectiveness in the health sector: Progress and lessons’, in Better Aid Series. 
Available at: oecd-library.org. 
Olmen, J. Van et al. (2012) Health Systems Frameworks in their Political Context  : Framing 
Divergent Agendas, BMC Public Health. BMC Public Health. doi: 10.1186/1471-2458-12-774. 
Omololu, F. O., Okunola, R. A. and Salami, K. K. (2012) ‘Equity and access to health care 
services: the experience of the Bamako initiative programme in Nigeria’, Journal of Medicine 
and Medical Sciences, 3(6), pp. 434–442. 
Paganini, A. (2004) ‘The Bamako Initiative was not about money’, Health Policy and 
Development, 2(1), pp. 11–13. 
Pascual Serrano, D., Vera Pasamontes, C. and Girón Moreno, R. (2016) ‘Modelos animales de 
dolor neuropático’, DOLOR, 31(2), pp. 70–76. doi: 10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004. 
Pearson, M. (2011) Results based aid and results based financing  : What are they  ? Have they 
delivered results  ? Available at: www.hlsp.org/institute. 
76 
Pereira, B. J. and Villota, C. (2012) Hitting the target  ? Evaluating the effectiveness of results 
based approaches to aid. 
Quaye, R. K. (2007) ‘Health care financing in Uganda: the role of social health insurance.’, 
International journal of health care quality assurance, 20(2–3), pp. 232–239. doi: 
10.1108/09526860710743363. 
Radelet, S. (2006) Primer on Foreign Aid. 92. 
Renaud, A. and Semasaka, J.-P. (2014) ‘Verification of Performance in Results-Based Financing 
(RBF): The Case of Community and Demand-Side RBF in Rwanda’, HNP Discussion Paper, 
(91772). 
Roberts, M. J. et al. (2002) Getting Health Reform Right. Oxford University Press. 
Sachs, J. (2012) ‘Achieving Universal Health Coverage in Low Income Countries’, The Lancet, 
380(9845), pp. 944–947. 
Sachs, J. and Ayittey, G. B. N. (2009) ‘Can foreign aid reduce poverty?’, in Controversies in 
globalisation, pp. 68–98. 
Salama, P. et al. (2014) ‘Post-crisis Zimbabwe’s innovative financing mechanisms in the social 
sectors: a practical approach to implementing the new deal for engagement in fragile states’, 
BMC International Health and Human Rights, 14(1), p. 35. doi: 10.1186/s12914-014-0035-6. 
Saunders, M., Lewis, P. and Thornhill, A. (2009) Research methods for business students. Fifth 
edit. Prentice Hall. 
Savedoff, W. D. (2011) Governance in the health sector, A strategy for measuring determinants 
and performance. 5655. 
Sida (2015) ‘Results Based Financing Approaches ( RBFA ) – what are they  ?’ 
Sithole, A. (2013) ‘Results Based Financing in Zimbabwe  : Any Changes in the Health Delivery 
System  ?’, Journal of Social Welfare and Human Rights, 1(June), pp. 36–46. 
Soeters, R. and Griffiths, F. (2003) ‘Improving Government Health Services Through Contract 
Management  : A Case from Cambodia’, in Health Policy and Planning. Oxford University Press, 
77 
pp. 74–83. 
Spors, F., Carbon, S. and Specialist, F. (2014) ‘Results Based Financing  : Its relevance for 
climate change mitigation and the CDM’. 
The World Bank (2005) ‘Financing health in low-income countries’, Health Financing Revisited, 
pp. 209–248. 
Toonen, J. et al. (2009) ‘LEARNING LESSONS ON IMPLEMENTING PERFORMANCE 
BASED FINANCING , FROM A MULTI-COUNTRY EVALUATION’, in Performance Based 
Financing A Synthesis Report. 
USAID (2011) Considerations for incorporating health equity into project designs  : A guide for 
community-oriented maternal , neonatal , and child health projects. 
Walters, R. S. and Blake, D. (1992) The politics of global economic relations. 4th Editio. 
Englewoood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
World Health Organisation (2009) Systems thinking for health systems strengthening. Edited by 
D. De Savigny and A. Taghreed.
78 
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Performance Indicators 
Development effectiveness criteria and key performance indicators 
THEME/CRITERIA DEFINITION KEY PERFORMANCE 
INDICATORS 
Governance Governance is the manner in 
which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s 
economic and social resources 
for development (World Bank). 
It refers to general exercise of 
authority, rule of law and 
government effectiveness 
Share of positions that are vacant 
Stock out rates for essential drugs 
Share of budgeted funds that are 
executed 
Share of health facilities that receive 
supervisory visits in accordance with 
national guidelines 
Allocative efficiency 
and effectiveness 
These measures how well an 
aid project uses resources in 
order to obtain desired results, 
benefiting most people at low 
cost, whether the right share of 
resources is being devoted to 
health care versus other goods 
in the economy.  
Percentage of government health 
budget allocated to primary care 
Per cent of government expenditure 
directed to primary care 
Personnel expenditure as a total of 
recurrent health expenditure 
Sustainability This is the ability of host 
countries to assume 
responsibility for programs 
outcomes without adversely 
affecting the ability to maintain 
or continue program objectives 
or outcomes. Sustainable 
projects are those with benefits 
that are likely to continue after 
donor funding has been 
withdrawn. 
Government health expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP 
Per cent of health expenditure 
financed by donors 
Total per capita expenditure on 
health 
Sources of financing for health and 
their relative shares of total 
expenditure 
Equity and 
inclusiveness 
Equity and inclusiveness for 
the purposes of this study 
means, everyone should have 
equal access to community 
resources and, opportunities, 
policy should be directed with 
impartiality, fairness and 
justice towards these ends and 
community partnership is key 
Community 
engagement/partnership/social 
participation in setting health 
priorities 
Access to health centres 
Involvement of marginalised and 
excluded people 
Communication of guidelines and 
standards to all staff and partners in 
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in setting development needs. accessible formats. 
Indicators and definitions adapted from (OECD, 2010), (Mehdi, 1999) and (Savedoff, 2011). 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire 
Questionnaire for the beneficiaries 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR PERSONNEL IN GOVERNMENT AND THE DONOR 
AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RBF IN ZIMBABWE 
Questionnaire Number: 
Please tick appropriate box where applicable 
SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHICS  
1. GENDER:
1. Male
2. Female
3. Prefer not to answer
2. Age group:
1. 20-39 years
2. 40-59 years
3. 60 years and above
3. Designation
1. Nursing Officer
2. Medical Officer
3. Health administrator
4. Policy maker
5. Donor  Community
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6. Other (Please specify) ………………………………………………… 
4. Years in the health system
1. 0-5 years
2. 6-10 years
3. 11-15 years
4. 15 -20 years
5. 20 years and above
5. Level of operation
1. District level
2. Provincial level
3. Ministry of Health Head Office
4. Donor organisation
5. Other (Please specify) ………………………………………………. 
SECTION B: Governance of Zimbabwe’s Health System 
6. Are there qualified and adequate personnel (nurses, doctors and administrators etc.) at
each level in Zimbabwe’s health system?
1) Yes   2) No   3) Not sure
If NO which areas of the health system are experiencing the most critical shortages in
personnel.
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
7. Is there a well-documented RBF policy framework in Zimbabwe’s health system?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
8. Are the set performance indicators collecting relevant and appropriate data on RBF at
institutional level?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
9. How do you rate the RBF implementation system in Zimbabwe in terms of monitoring,
evaluation and auditing on a scale 1-5?
81 
Variable 1. Very
weak
2.Weak 3.Satisfactory 4. Good 5.Excellent
Internal monitoring 
External monitoring 
SECTION C: Allocative Efficiency and Effectiveness in Zimbabwe’s Health System After the 
Introduction of RBF 
10. Were community needs incorporated in the RBF framework through a baseline study?
1)Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
11. Are the health institutions accessible to the target beneficiaries in terms of distance and
cost?
a) Distance 1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
b) Cost 1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
12. How would you rate health institutions in terms of equipment, medicines and health
personnel to meet the health needs of target beneficiaries?
 Variable 1. Very
weak
2.Weak  3.Satisfactory 4. Good 5.Excellent
Equipment 
Medicines 
Qualified health personnel 
13. Does RBF cover all the units within a health institution or there is selective application
of departments covered by the programme?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
If your response is Yes or No how does this affect the moral of health personnel not covered 
or covered by the RBF programme at institutional level  
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
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14. Has RBF promoted effectiveness and efficiency in the use of resources at institutional
level?
1) Yes     2) No               3) Not sure
Section D: Equity and Inclusiveness in Zimbabwe’s Health System After Introduction of RBF
15. Has the implementation of RBF promoted equal opportunity for both men and women
to improve and maintain their health well-being?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
16. Is there equity in health care provision in Zimbabwe’s rural areas as a result of RBF?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
Please justify your response if it is Yes or No 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
SECTION E: SUSTAINABILITY OF RBF IN ZIMBABWE’S HEALTH SYSTEM 
17. How long has been RBF implementation programme in Zimbabwe?
1. 0-5 years
2. 2) 6-10 years
3. 3) 11-15 years
4. 4) 16 years and above
18. Is the implementation period of RBF so far sufficient to achieve the goals of the health
system?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
19. Can the Zimbabwe health system sustain the momentum built by RBF after the donors
pull out of the programme?
1) Yes 2) No 3) Not sure
 If your response is Yes or No, please justify your response 
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………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
SECTION F: Suggestions and Recommendations for Improving Implementation of RBF in 
Zimbabwe’s Health System 
20. Can you give suggestions on how to improve the implementation of RBF in Zimbabwe’s
health system in order to achieve efficiency, equity, effectiveness, accountability and
responsiveness that meet the health needs of the people?
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………… 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION!!! 
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Appendix 3: Interview Schedule 
Interview Schedule for Key Informants 
Introduction 
My name is Yvonne Mutopo, I am a Masters in Development Finance student with University of 
Cape Town Graduate School of Business researching on health care financing models in 
Zimbabwe. I am particularly interested in the Results Based Financing Model, targeting health 
care at primary level in rural areas. My questions are structured around three broad areas; how 
the health system works, performance of the RBF model and preconditions for health care 
financing in developing economies using Zimbabwe as a case study. Can you kindly tell me 
about yourself, your role in the Zimbabwean health system and possibly how long you have been 
working within the system? 
Health systems thinking 
1. How do you best describe the Zimbabwean health system and how it works?
2. Can you tell me about the history and evolution of health care financing in Zimbabwe and
what has shaped its discourses?
3. In your opinion, what influenced changes in funding models from as far as you can
remember?
4. Can you describe the state of primary health care prior to RBF introduction?
5. What prompted RBF implementation and how the intervention was designed within the
context of Zimbabwe?
6. How has/is the RBF model strengthening the Zimbabwean health system?
Performance of the RBF model: efficiency, effectiveness, equity and sustainability 
1. How has the RBF programme performed in Zimbabwe?
2. What could have been done better?
3. What would you change given the opportunity to redesign the programme for the better?
4. How does RBF in the health sector succeed in benefiting the groups and individuals it
targets?
5. What measures are in place to ensure access to those geographically disadvantaged, women
who find it difficult to access health services because of religious and cultural constraints?
6. What in your view is and has been the role of incentives in RBF?
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7. How are the incentives managed at health centre level?
8. What is the long-term effect of the whole incentives system to health personnel in the long
term?
Preconditions for effective health care financing in Zimbabwe 
1. What are the minimum conditions for any developmental funding in Zimbabwe?
2. What lessons can be learnt from other countries from which Zimbabwe can capitalise to reap
the full benefits of the RBF model in financing its health system?
3. What can be done to improve the implementation of RBF in Zimbabwe?
THANK YOU!!! 
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Appendix 4: Expanded Analytical Tables 
Appendix 4.1: Trends in the health outcomes (selected few) 
Time Period 2005-
2010 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Mortality  
Under 5 76% 82% 79% 77% 74% 71% 69% 
Infant 63.5% 57% 55% 53% 52% 51% 50% 
Basic vaccination coverage 59% 64% 66% 69% 73% 75% 76% 
Unmet needs for Family 
Planning   
15% 15% 14% 13.5% 12.9% 12.7% 13% 
Child stunting 33.5 35% 34.7% 33.1% 29.6% 28.4% 27% 
Trends in net-ownership 17% 29% 35% 38% 42% 46% 48% 
Trends in H.I.V Testing:  
Women  
19.4% 34% 37% 40% 44% 47% 49% 
Men 13.4% 21% 25% 28% 31% 34% 36% 
Source: Adapted from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (2015) and (2010-
11) (Averages used in some instances due to overlapping periods)
Appendix 4.2: Overall healthcare outcomes by Province 
Health outcome Mash West Mash Central Mash West 
Under 5 mortality 101 90 101 
Health facility deliveries (National average = 77%) 66% 69% 73% 
Basic vaccination Coverage (National average = 76%) 78% 80% 83% 
H.I.V Prevalence Rate (National average = 14%) 13% 15% 12% 
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Appendix 4.3: Source of Modern Contraceptive methods 
Type of contraceptives Public Sector Private Sector Other sources 
2005-06 68% 22% 10% 
2010-11 73% 14% 13% 
2015 73% 22% 5% 
Source: Adapted from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (2015), (2010-11) 
and (2005-06) 
Appendix 4.4: Trends in the use of Modern Contraceptive methods 
Period	  1-­‐1988,	  Period	  2-­‐1994,	  Period	  3-­‐1999,	  Period	  4-­‐2005-­‐06,	  Period	  5-­‐2010-­‐2011,	  Period	  6-­‐2015	  
Source: Adapted from the Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (2015), page 111 
Appendix 4.5: Performance of RBF in terms of Internal monitoring 
Frequency Percent Valid Per cent Cumulative Per cent 
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Valid Very weak 17 53.1 53.1 53.1 
weak 8 25.0 25.0 78.1 
Satisfactory 4 12.5 12.5 90.6 
Good 1 3.1 3.1 93.8 
Excellent 2 6.3 6.3 100.0 
Total 32 100.0 100.0 
Source: SPSS Output Data 
Appendix 4.6: Level of operation and Years in the health system  
Years in the health system Total 
0 - 5 
years 
6 - 10 
years 
11 - 15 
years 
16 - 20 
years 
over 20 
years 
Level of 
operation 
District level 8 0 0 0 0 8 
Provincial Level 0 3 2 3 0 8 
Ministry of Health 
Head office 
0 1 1 2 4 8 
Donor Organisation 0 1 3 0 0 4 
Other 0 3 1 0 0 4 
Total 8 8 7 5 4 32 
